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Abstract 
 Apology is an important tool for the maintenance of positive and cooperative 
relationships in the workplace. This paper reviews the existing research in the field of 
apology, and identifies four main components of apology. It uses impression 
management theory and signaling theory to explain the effect of apology. In addition, 
it proposes moderating effect of the offender's facial dominance on the effectiveness 
of apology. Specifically, Previous research (e.g., Perrett et al., 1998) found that people 
with high facial dominance are less trustworthy, which suggests that apology may act 
as an equalizer between people with high and low facial dominance. Through 
application of signaling and impression management framework it generates concrete 
predictions about the apology outcomes.  
Scenario-based within-subject Study 1 revealed that offers of compensation 
are the most effective type of apology in workplace context. Offers of compensation 
are even more effective when used by people with high facial dominance as compared 
to people with low facial dominance. Our analysis also showed that perceived 
sincerity of apology is the underlying mechanism that explains these differences. 
Between-subject Study 2 used behavioral measures of trust restoration. Using PDG 
paradigm, one hundred forty three participants experienced defection during their 
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interaction with dominant versus non dominant partner and offered different types of 
apologies or no apology. While the results suggested people reacted differently on no 
apology vs. apology conditions, we did not find any differences between different 
types of apology, which suggests that there might be difference between our beliefs 
about how we would react to different apologies (results of Study 1), while we do not 
make these distinctions in real situations (results of Study 2). Implications of these 
findings for Impression Management and Signaling theory are discussed. In addition, 
we proposed practical implications of our findings. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Working in an organization involves encountering conflicts, and being able to 
deal with them effectively and constructively can be a considerable help to one's 
career. Maintenance of positive and cooperative relationships in the workplace can 
increase individual and collective productivity (De Dreu, 2008). Failure to do so leads 
to mistrust, hostility, and revenge-seeking behavior, which ultimately diverts one's 
resources and leads to decrease in performance. For example, in their review Aquino, 
Grover, Goldman and Folger (2003) argued that damaged work relationships and 
related anger and resentment have a debilitating effect on performance and 
productivity whenever people must work on interdependent tasks. Therefore the 
authors made an appeal to all people in managerial positions to make forgiveness in 
the workplace one of their top concerns (Aquino, Grover, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). 
Many times, what makes difference between the cycle of mistrust and retaliations and 
a restoration of productive relationship is an adequate apology (Lazare, 2004; Long & 
Brecke, 2003). 
 However, the success of an apology is not determined only by its content, but 
also by other aspects of the particular situation. Scholars have looked at factors such 
as personality of the offender and of the victim (e.g., Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster & 
Montada, 2004), but sometimes the involved parties do not have enough time to 
create such a complex impression of each other. In these situations, the appearance of 
the offender, or more specifically the characteristics of his or her facial features will 
be the most salient source of his or her impression. This impression is then bound to 
influence the victim's reaction to the uttered apology. 
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Chapter 2: Definition of Apology 
 In his classical work Goffman (1971)defined apology as a "gesture through 
which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense 
and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended 
rule" (p. 113). This suggests that the main function of apology is to persuade the 
audience that the transgression is not representative of the offender's character, and 
therefore that he or she should not be judged based on it. The goal is to improve the 
offender's impression. In addition to this, Goffman also presented apology as one 
category of remedial devices, whose function is to regulate social situations. There 
are three ways a victim can react to the transgression: by revenge, forgiveness, or 
reconciliation. All these can be perceived as the victim's attempts to cope with the 
event of transgression (Aquino et al., 2003; Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006). Revenge 
includes all kinds of aggressive behavior that are aimed on the offender. The main 
difference between forgiveness and reconciliation is that forgiveness is an 
intrapersonal phenomenon characterized by neither seeking any revenge on the 
offender, nor reestablishing any positive or trusting relationship with the offender. 
Reconciliation, on the other hand, is an interpersonal phenomenon, which includes 
the rebuilding of mutual trust. From this point of view, apology is one of the means of 
striving for reconciliation and trust enhancement (Lewicki & Polin, 2012), and the 
goal to rescue the relationship is emphasized over mere saving of the offender's face. 
 Lazare (2004) proposed that apology is an encounter between two parties: the 
offender and the victim. During this encounter, the offender acknowledges the 
responsibility for an offense and expresses regret or remorse for it. In this study I will 
define apology as one of the tactics of impression management of the offender 
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(Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Schlenker & Darby, 1981), which is 
characterized by specific type of verbal content, and whose goal is to enhance trust 
between parties after some transgression occurred. 
 
Chapter 3: Apologies, Excuses, and Justifications and how to Distinguish Them 
 There are more than one tactic of impression management available to the 
offender. The main difference between these tactics is in the content of their verbal 
accounts. From this perspective I can differentiate apologies from excuses and 
justifications. The distinguishing feature of apology is that it acknowledges the 
damage to the relationship (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004), accepts 
responsibility for the damage, and expresses the offender's remorse for the 
transgression (Conlon & Murray, 1996). Justification also accepts responsibility for 
the incident. However, justification denies negative quality of the event (Riordan, 
Marlin, & Kellogg, 1983). In other words, it reframes or reinterprets the act so it is 
more socially acceptable. Typical examples of justifications include attempts to 
downplay the severity of the problem and claims of good underlying intentions. 
 Excuses do not try to minimize the severity of the transgression; instead, they 
admit that the act was reprehensible, but at the same time the transgressor tries to 
shake off the responsibility for the event (Riordan et al., 1983; Schlenker, Pontari, & 
Christopher, 2001). Excuses deny either intentions to produce the negative 
consequences or the offender's control over his or her action (Riordan, Marlin & 
Kellogg, 1983). A typical example of an excuse is a situation where the offender 
claims that the transgression was not his or her fault because he or she was following 
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another person's instructions and therefore cannot be held responsible.  
 As compared to these three types of verbal accounts that were discussed 
above, Lewicki and Polin (2012) distinguished excuses, explanations, and apologies. 
Their conceptualization of excuses and apologies is in accordance with other authors; 
however, explanations were defined as “verbal accounts that attempt to offer reasons 
and rationales for why a particular past action has occurred” (p. 105). In my opinion, 
this category is a bit ambiguous. The first reason is that both justifications and 
excuses could be categorized as explanations, and therefore it is difficult to 
distinguish them from each other. In addition, many authors (e.g., Lazare, 2004; 
Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, & Montada, 2004) include 
explanation as one of the components of apology. Ultimately, apologies, excuses, and 
justifications can all be perceived as different tactics of improvement of one's 
impression in the eyes of victim, with a specific mechanism of their effect. 
Explanation, on the other hand, does not have a clear tactical effect on offender's 
impression, unless it takes the form of justification, excuse, or apology.  
 Another tactic of impression management that is frequently included in the 
literature is denial of the transgression or offense. As compared to excuses, 
justifications, and apologies, denials refuse to admit the existence of the transgressing 
event, any participation on it, or any knowledge of it. From this perspective, denials 
might be relatively close to excuses, because they can be accompanied with 
condemnation of the transgression event, if it had happened. However, it is important 
that this condemnation is only conditional or hypothetical, because the denier claims 
complete ignorance of the incident. As a result, the denier's impression and the 
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relationship with the accuser cannot be legitimately influenced by the event. 
 In terms of effect on the trust repair, the research shows mixed results. Sigal, 
Hsu, Foodim, and Betman (1988) showed that denial of misconduct is more effective 
than apology in integrity-related transgressions. Similarly, Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and 
Dirks (2007) demonstrated that while denial is more successful for integrity-based 
transgressions (e.g., intentional accounting violation), apologies are more effective for 
competence-based transgressions (e.g., accounting violation due to mistake). This is a 
result of cognitive biases, where people tend to emphasize positive information about 
performance over negative information (i.e., competence based transgressions), while 
they have the opposite tendency in actions concerning moral integrity of a person. 
The problem with these studies is that judges, whose task was to create an impression 
of the offender, were not direct victims of the offender's transgression (e.g., Ferrin, 
Kim, Cooper & Dirks, 2007). Therefore, the studies dealt with impression 
management in front of an audience rather than in the eyes of the victim. In situations 
where the judge is also the victim, the effectiveness of denial is limited by the 
existence of plausible alternative explanations of the occurrence of the event. If there 
is no plausible alternative explanation, the trusting relationship between the involved 
parties will be negatively affected, because this impasse implies that one of the parties 
is not sincere in their claims. 
 In terms of effectiveness of excuses and justifications, some studies suggest 
that excuses are more effective than justifications, at least in the case of integrity-
based transgressions (Riordan, Marlin & Kellogg, 1983). However, they still seem to 
have a negative effect on a perceived moral characteristics of the offender (Schlenker, 
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Pontari & Christopher, 2001). 
 
Chapter 4: Motivation to Apologize 
 Lazare (2004) provided an account of possible motivations that can underlie 
offender's tendency to apologize for a transgression. First, tendency to apologize can 
stem from emotional factors, where the offender is motivated by the experience of 
shame, guilt, and empathic regard for victim. Research has shown that when people 
act against their internalized norms, they are likely to experience guilt and other 
negative self-related affects (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Monteith, 
Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993), which consequently leads to corrective behavior 
(Monteith, 1993). Further, an offender can be motivated by the desire to restore the 
relationship and to avoid further damage to the relationship because of the value of 
the relationship itself. Offender's need for social inclusion can become salient after a 
damaging event, which leads to the fear of abandonment and social exclusion (Leary, 
Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). An offender can be also motivated by the prospect 
of negative consequences of the victim's reaction to the transgression. Empirical 
research has supported the claim that people have a natural tendency to punish and 
retaliate, even at their own cost (Sigmund, 2007). These motives are essentially 
economical, because in long term, cooperation is frequently much more advantageous 
than mistrust or retaliation (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009), and people are generally 
motivated to maximize their reward-cost ratios in social relationships (Leary & 
Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). Finally, apology can be motivated by strictly 
external sources, such as pressure of social norms and impression in front of others 
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(E. Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002). 
 
Chapter 5: Mechanisms of Effect of Apology 
 The most commonly used model of the effect of apology perceives apology as 
a part of impression management. Impression management is defined as a “conscious 
or unconscious attempt to control the images that are projected in real or imagined 
social interactions” (Schlenker, 1980, p. 6); in other words, it describes situations 
where a person tries to influence the way he or she is perceived by others. There are 
two classes of impression management: assertive and defensive impression 
management tactics (e.g., Ellis, West, Ryan, & DeShon, 2002). Assertive tactics try to 
evoke interpersonal liking, attraction, and perceptions of competence (Stevens & 
Kristof, 1995). Defensive tactics defend or repair one's image, and include excuses, 
justifications, and apologies. Within this framework, the function of apology is to 
improve the transgressor's impression by dissociating him or her from the 
transgression event itself (Goffman, 1971; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). This is 
achieved by communication of the offender's psychological state that is incompatible 
with the transgression and its reoccurrence in the future (Scher & Darley, 1997). For 
example, communication of guilt shows that the offender shares social norms and 
values that condemn the transgression event (Scher & Darley, 1997), and that these 
norms are internalized enough to cause aversive reaction when they are transgressed 
(Monteith et al., 1993).  
Research has also shown that these negative self-related emotions increase 
sensitivity to the related actions in the future, which essentially prevents reoccurrence 
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of the transgression in the future (Monteith, 1993). This mechanism creates an 
impression of the offender as a person who will adhere to the shared social norms 
(Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie, 1989, Scher & Darley, 1997). Schmitt, Gollwitzer, 
Förster, and Montada (2004) included an additional step in the mechanism of the 
effect of apology, where the victim creates a mental representation of the offender's 
apology, and this mental representation then influences the impression of the offender. 
Impression management research has also shown that in addition to the improvement 
in the offender's impression, apologies mitigate the victim's emotional response to the 
transgression and offender, which consequently leads to reduction of aggressive 
behavior of the victim (Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Schmitt et al., 2004).  
 Clinically oriented scholars focused on the needs that the transgression elicits 
in the victim. From this perspective, apologies repair relationships through the 
satisfaction of these needs (Lazare, 2004). Victims suffer from the loss of power 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), which leads to the need for restoration of self-respect and 
dignity, need of assurance of safety in their relationships (Baumeister et al., 1994), 
and need to see the offender suffer (Ohbuchi et al., 1989). In addition, the 
transgression affected the impression of the offender, which leads to the need of 
assurance that both parties share the same values. Also, the transgression caused 
damage to the victim, which leads to the need of reparation for the harm caused by 
the offense. It also seems that different types of transgressions are more likely to elicit 
different needs. For example, Reb, Goldman, Kray, and Cropanzano (2006) found 
that procedural injustice (unfair treatment) is related to need for control, while 
interactional injustice (lack of respect for individual) is more likely to induce need for 
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meaning. The satisfaction of these needs then influences the victim's willingness to 
forgive and reconcile. 
 Lastly, there is the more behavioral approach of signaling theory (Long & 
Becke, 2003). Signaling theory deals with situations in which cooperation can 
provide better outcomes than individual effort. However, these situations also present 
an inherent increased risk of exploitation. Therefore, every involved party does not 
want to cooperate unless the other parties are intending to cooperate too. This leads to 
a pressure on every aspiring cooperator to be able to accurately identify behavioral 
intentions of the other party (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). However, the task of 
communication of honest intentions is made difficult by the fact that there is always 
an advantage in the ability to feign the intention to cooperate while actually intending 
to exploit the other party (Fridlund, 1991). Therefore, the only viable signals of 
cooperation are the ones that are relatively hard to fake. This scenario is clearly 
applicable to the situation following transgression, when the offender is trying to 
apologize and thus repair the relationship. The victim does not want to reconcile with 
someone who is likely to transgress again in the future. The main aim of the offender 
is therefore to reestablish trust; in other words, to persuade the victim that any other 
incident of transgression will not repeat in the future. Signaling theory hypothesizes 
that the best way to (re)establish a cooperative relationship is by communicating 
signals that are either out of the signaler's voluntary control or that provide a measure 
of commitment to the intention to cooperate. In other words, effective signals have to 
be either uncontrollable (Fridlund, 1991; Zahavi, 1975), or costly for the signaler 
(Zahavi, 1975). Long and Becke (2003) applied this framework directly on the 
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problem of apology. They identified four factors that constitute signals that provide a 
measure of commitment to the pursuit of trust repair in the situation of apology: 
novelty, vulnerability, voluntariness, and irrevocability.  Novel signals are reliable 
because of the cognitive effort invested in them serves as a measure of commitment. 
Vulnerability in front of the victim is reliable, because it gives victim power and 
control over the situation, and thus it can be potentially costly for the offender. 
Voluntariness means that the offender is apologizing out of his or her own initiative. 
Voluntariness and irrevocability are costly, because they prevent any possibility of 
denial. 
 
Chapter 6: Components of Apology 
 The content of verbal account of apology can be further differentiated into 
components of apology. The probability that these components will be used depends 
on the situational factors of the particular apology, such as nature and seriousness of 
the transgression (e.g., Schlenker & Darby, 1981), or former mutual relationship 
between the parties (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2004). The first attempt to systematically 
map these components is usually credited to Goffman (1971). Goffman differentiated 
following components of apology: expression of embarrassment, acknowledgment of 
transgression of a conduct and sympathy with application of negative sanction, verbal 
rejection and disavowal of the wrong conduct and self-castigation of the self that so 
behaved, adoption and advocacy of the right way and forbearance, and penance and 
volunteering of compensation. These components present more refined tools, whose 
purpose is to remedy different aspect of the transgression's impact on the relationship 
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between offender and the victim. While most authors describe Goffman's five 
components of apology as their primary source of inspiration (e.g., Schlenker & 
Darby, 1981; Schmitt et al., 2004), even a brief glance on a comparison Table 1 
testifies about little consistency amongst authors. In the following text, we will try to 
pinpoint some reoccurring themes. 
 All the frequently used components of apology can be divided into four 
categories: cognitive, empathy, empowering, and compensating component (cf. 
Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). The core of cognitive category is the acknowledgment of the 
transgression and related acknowledgment of the responsibility for the transgression. 
These components include correct identification of the transgression event and of the 
relevant social norm (Scher & Darley, 1997). Further, the roles of the two involved 
parties should be appropriately identified as offender and victim, which prevents 
doubts and unclarity about the responsibility for the transgression. Offender should 
also adequately recognize a level of seriousness of the transgression with its 
consequences as perceived by the victim (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). The correct 
identification of transgressed social norms, acknowledgment of responsibility, 
appropriate level of seriousness assigned to the transgression, and other cognitive 
aspects may serve as a reliable signal for the victim that the offender shares the same 
social values. Its reliability lies in the fact that it would be hard to describe the 
victim's representation of the incident without sharing the same values and norms 
(Long & Becke, 2003). 
 Lazare (2004) derived his components as answers to particular victim's needs. 
Acknowledgments of transgression and responsibility answer the victim's need for 
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assurance that both parties have shared values, and the need of assurance that the 
transgression was not victim's fault. Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, and Montada (2004) 
showed that victim's satisfaction with offender's expression of cognitive component 
has the strongest remedial effect on victim's emotional response to the transgression 
and on offender's impression. Fehr and Gelfand (2010) used similar component of 
apology, but while they confirmed significant positive effect of this component on 
victim's forgiveness, this effect was relatively smaller than the effect of emotional and 
compensating components. Similarly, Scher and Darley (1997) found that cognitive 
components are relatively equally effective as other components of apology, in terms 
of offender's impression improvement and improvements in victims affective 
reactions. It would be tempting to argue that this difference is caused by the 
differences in the used scenarios and overall design. Nevertheless, all three described 
studies used very similar informal and friendly scenarios therefore this cannot 
account for the observed differences in results. This could mean that the model tested 
in the studies is missing some important variable, which is responsible for this 
additional variance in the data. In addition, the similarity of used scenarios leads to 
difficulties with generalizability of the presented findings. It is entirely possible that 
transgression within organizational context might lead to increased salience of social 
norms and rules as compared to more informal context (R. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010), 
which would increase the importance of cognitive component in the apology. At this 
point we have to conclude that we do not have enough evidence neither to resolve 
these contradicting findings, nor to be able to identify specific implications for 
broader contexts of apologies in more or less formal environments.  
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 The second category of components of apology pertains to offender's and 
victim's emotions. Expressions of remorse and empathy belong to this category. Their 
function is to show that the offender experiences negative self-related affects as a 
result of the transgression, which indicates that he or she has internalized the relevant 
social norms, and therefore that the transgression is not going to repeat in the future 
(Baumeister et al., 1994; Monteith et al., 1993; Monteith, 1993). In addition, negative 
self-directed emotions serve as self-punishment that helps to regulate behavior with 
respect to internalized norms and values (Monteith, 1993). In terms of impression 
management, these expressed self-directed negative emotions create a dissociation 
between the impression of the offender and the transgression in the perspectives of 
victim. In other words, it shows that the offender disapproves of the transgression 
(Monteith et al., 1993), and therefore he (she) should not be judged based on the 
transgression (Scher & Darley, 1997). This way, it should lead to improvement of 
offender's impression (Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Scher & Darley, 1997).  
 From the signaling theory perspective, emotional components of apology 
could be perceived as a reliable signal of future cooperation and adherence to social 
norms, because the self-punishing nature of these emotions is costly and may serve as 
a measure of commitment to the social norms (Fridlund, 1991; Lazare, 2004; 
Monteith, 1993). The effect of emotional components of apology will increase if they 
are unexpected (Long & Becke, 2003). 
 Scher and Darley (1997) argued that expression of remorse is the most 
important component to communicate in an apology. This claim seems to be in 
agreement with predictions of clinically oriented scholars, who argue that 
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communication of warm empathy is essential so the victim can overcome cold 
feelings of resentment and associated revenge-seeking behaviors (e.g., Baumeister et 
al., 1994). However, the available evidence with relation to these claims is somewhat 
contradicting. For example, the most recent study by Fehr and Gelfand (2010) 
showed that empathy components of apology had the strongest effect on forgiveness 
and reconciliation. Nevertheless, Scher and Darley's (1997) original data did not find 
a significant effect of emotional components of apology. Moreover, Schmitt with 
colleagues (2004) failed to find a direct effect of offender's statements expressing 
regret altogether. Despite the lack of direct effect, Schmitt et al. (2004) found that 
victim's perception of whether the offender was regretful did significantly improve 
offender's impression and victim's emotional reaction. This suggests that while it is 
advantageous to communicate regret, it might be difficult to do so through direct 
statements – at least in certain conditions. As was already mentioned, this 
incongruence is more surprising, considering that all three studies used very similar 
sample, scenario to manipulate the transgression, and the formulation of the 
components was also very similar. 
 The third category consists of components characterized by their empowering 
effect on the victim. It includes request of forgiveness and self-castigation. Request 
for forgiveness shows offender's humility, which is considered to be a submissive 
display that decreases social power of the requester. For example, Anderson, 
Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, and Chatman (2006) showed that modesty and humility 
serve as a constraint on power of the modest individual (see also Keltner, Van Kleef, 
Chen, & Kraus, 2008). Transgressions often cause victims' loss of power and control 
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over the situation, and offender's request for forgiveness gives the power and control 
back to the victim (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). In different set of studies, Ohbuchi, 
Kameda, and Agarie (1989) asked their respondents to imagine that they were victims 
of a transgression and rate their desire to hear different components of apology. 
Request for forgiveness was within the four most desired components, and this desire 
increased with the seriousness of the transgression. 
 Self-castigation has a similar effect as asking for forgiveness in that it 
increases the power of the victim. Offender declares him- or herself to be incompetent 
and in other aspects inferior, which should by contrast increase victim's power and 
self-esteem (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). In addition, offender's self-humiliation can be 
perceived as costly for his impression, and therefore a reliable signal of desire to 
restore the relationship and stay committed to it (Long & Becke, 2003). Schlenker 
and Darby (1981) offered alternative explanation of the effect of self-castigation. 
They proposed that self-castigation disparages the part of the offender's impression 
that is responsible for the transgression. This way it helps to differentiate themselves 
form the transgression and as a result improve their impression in the eyes of the 
victim. In a related empirical study they also found that self-castigation and explicit 
request for apology are more likely to be used when seriousness of the transgression 
was high, and offender's responsibility was also high (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). 
They explained it by the fact that request for forgiveness and self-castigation imply 
high levels of self-blame and therefore they are used mainly in situations of greater 
importance. 
 In any case, both request for forgiveness and self-castigation present situations 
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when offender decides to be vulnerable in front of the victim. Request for forgiveness 
always faces the possibility that it is going to be denied, and self-castigation exposes 
offender's weaknesses. Both of these situations give the victim the upper hand; i.e., 
they increase his or her social power. Willingness to be vulnerable in front of other is 
one of the most usually cited definitions of trust (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998), and therefore it is likely that this factor plays an important role in 
reconciliation and trust repair. 
 Offer of compensation is the last category of components of apology. One 
perspective emphasizes that it answers victim's need for reparation for the harm 
caused by the offense (Lazare, 2004). Alternatively, offer of compensation makes 
offender vulnerable, because if the victim accepts the offer, the offender loses 
resources. Offender's vulnerability also increases victim's power, which was lost as a 
result of the transgression (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). In addition, the amount of 
compensation offered can be used as a measure of honest intention and commitment 
to the relationship, as predicted by signaling theory. Indeed, Desmet, De Cremer, and 
van Dijk (2011a) found that slight overcompensation for the caused harm improves 
trust repair between offender and victim. 
Many researchers replicated the trust-restoring effect of compensation under different 
conditions (e.g. Lewicki & Polin, 2012; Scher & Darley, 1997; Schlenker & Darby, 
1981; Schmitt et al., 2004). Fehr and Gelfand (2012) showed that the effect of 
compensation offer is relatively stronger in inducing reconciliation as compared to 
other components of apology. 
 The claim that vulnerability of the offender might be central to the effect of 
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offer of compensation is supported by research conducted by Bottom and his 
colleagues (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002). They asked participants 
to play iterated prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) to investigate the effect of different 
offers of compensation on trust repair. In PDG, players have to individually decide 
whether to use cooperative or competitive strategy. They can obtain highest joint 
outcomes when they both play cooperative strategy. However, individually, the best 
strategy for Player 1 is to compete when Player 2 chooses to cooperate. Situation 
where both players choose to compete yields lowest both joint outcomes. Thus 
prisoner's dilemma game presents a mixed motive situation, where cooperative 
relationship between the two parties can be built only on mutual trust. In Bottom et 
al.'s study participants engaged in repeated form of this game, where the other player 
was in fact not a real person, but a computer algorithm. This algorithm then 
manipulated transgression (by choosing a competitive option) and consequent 
attempts to restore the trust (by means of messages sent to the victim). This design 
allowed the researchers to investigate different types of compensation offers. Results 
showed that open offers of compensation, where the offender asked what it would 
take for the victim to resume cooperation, were the most effective. Moreover, thus 
reconciled trust showed to hold even in situation where there was no possibility of 
any additional reciprocity.  
 It is important to note that in these situations compensation is offered 
voluntarily, because forced compensation clearly cannot reestablish trust. Even 
though in certain conditions forced compensation can signal adherence to social 
norms, it does not show commitment to the relationship with the victim. In addition, 
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voluntarity is one of the aspects that makes signal reliable (Long & Becke, 2003). 
From signaling theory perspective, offer of compensation has one more advantage. 
Research has shown that mere offer of compensation is sometimes effective in 
restoring trust, without victim's accepting the compensation (Bottom et al., 2002). 
However, the situation also allows victim to test whether the offender is ready to 
follow through with the offer. This way, the commitment to the offer can be a 
measure of offender's commitment to the relationship with the victim. All these 
aspects make offer of compensation the most effective component form signaling 
theory perspective. 
 Many studies were not interested in the effect of specific components, but 
were rather focused on more general aspects of apology. This research showed that 
with the increasing severity of the transgression and offender's stronger responsibility 
for it, more components are likely to be employed (Schlenker & Darby, 1981) and 
they consequently increase the probability of positive outcome(Ohbuchi et al., 1989). 
More specifically, Schlenker and Darby (1981) identified perfunctory statements, 
such as “Pardon me” and “I am sorry”. These are appropriate in situations where the 
transgressions are of a small consequence for the victim, but are perceived as 
insincere in relation to more serious offenses. As severity of transgression increases, 
so should the elaboration of the particular components of apology in order to assure 
the same level of sincerity (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). In a related manner, Lazarus' 
clinical approach (2004) differentiates apologetic and compassionate “I am sorry”. 
Apologetic “I am sorry” expresses remorse over the offense and victim's negative 
consequences. Compassionate “I am sorry”, on the other hand, expresses mere regret 
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over the consequences for the victim, but not a remorse over the transgression itself 
and therefore victims are likely not to perceive such compassionate statements as 
apologies. With this respect, Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster and Montada (2004) 
introduced an important distinction. They differentiated objective account of 
apology, which consists of components uttered by the offender in his or her apology, 
and subjective account of apology, which is victim's representation of offender's 
apology. Victim's subjective account also consists of components of apology, which 
do not necessarily have to be identical to the objective account. Some components 
may be perceived as implied, other components could be perceived as insincere and 
therefore might not be included in the subjective account. For example, victims can 
infer remorse from the harm-doer’s admission of fault, while this does not have to be 
the case. Alternatively, acknowledgment of transgression can sometimes stand alone 
with other components being implied. In situations of little importance, some 
utterances, whose content would assign them to different categories, are in fact mere 
acknowledgments of transgression. For example, when a person accidentally hits 
someone with very little force, he or she may say “Pardon me.” However, such 
statement should not be categorized as a request for forgiveness. Indeed, the offender 
is unlikely to even wait for the victim's response. In this situation it is just an 
acknowledgment of transgression. If needed, this can be further refined by inclusion 
of other cognitive components of apology. The more severe the transgression, the 
more elaborate the apology (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Schmitt with his colleagues 
indeed found that subjects' representations of objective account components was 
relatively inaccurate, and that the relationship between objective account components 
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and outcomes was mediated by the victims' subjective perception of them (Schmitt et 
al., 2004). 
 
Chapter 7: Other Factors Influencing Effectiveness of Apology 
 Research has shown that there is a number of factors that can affect the 
effectiveness of apology and its components. Perhaps the most important factor is the 
perceived sincerity of the apology (e.g., Tomlinson et al., 2004). For example, 
Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki (2004) found that perceived sincerity of the offender 
has relatively strongest effect on the willingness to reconcile and that perceived 
sincerity is a significant moderator of the effect of apology. In addition, Darby and 
Schlenker (1989) found that children perceive offender who apologized insincerely 
more negatively. From signaling theory perspective, perceived sincerity of the 
apology can be understood as the degree to which the victim is persuaded that the 
apology is a reliable signal of offender's remorse and commitment to the relationship 
and therefore we can assume an important role of sincerity (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; 
Long & Becke, 2003). In addition, sincerity is frequently assumed to be an underlying 
mechanism of the observed effect, but it is not measured (Bottom et al., 2002; Frantz 
& Bennigson, 2005). To summarize, while there are strong theoretical reasons for the 
effect of sincerity, the number of studies testing this assumption is relatively low. 
 Perceived severity of transgression has been shown to have an important 
influence on the effect of apology. The more severe is the transgression in the eyes of 
the victim, the less likely the apology leads to trust repair and improvement of 
offender's impression (e.g., Liao, 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004). Studies also showed 
21 
 
 
that to an extent this can be compensated for by including more components in the 
uttered apology (Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). In addition to 
perceived severity, the nature of transgression has been shown to negatively influence 
the effectiveness of apology. Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004) found that while 
it is beneficial for the offender to apologize for transgressions that were caused by 
some competence-related failure, it is better to deny culpability in situations when 
they are accused of integrity-based transgression (see also Desmet et al., 2011a; 
Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011b; Ferrin et al., 2007). Kim et al. (2004) 
explained this by cognitive biases, where people tend to emphasize positive 
information about performance over negative information, while they have opposite 
tendency in actions concerning moral integrity of a person (Kim et al., 2004). As was 
already mentioned, the studies that support the benefits of denial have the limitation 
that the judges, whose task was to create an impression of the offender, were not 
direct victims of the offender's transgression (e.g., Ferrin et al., 2007). Our interest 
lies in the repair of relationship with the victim and therefore the implications of these 
results for our topic are rather unclear. Nevertheless, Desmet, Cremer, and Dijk 
(2011) have shown that even when an offender faces his or her victim, victim's beliefs 
about whether the offender used deception or other strategy involving bad intent has a 
negative effect on the effectiveness of apology.  
 In terms of timing of the apology, research yielded contradicting results, 
suggesting that there are tradeoffs between speed and thoughtfulness of the apology. 
Some studies indicate that delayed apology is perceived as an afterthought and 
therefore as less sincere (Liao, 2007; Tomlinson et al., 2004). Other studies showed 
22 
 
 
that delayed apology can be effective, but only when the victim feels heard and 
understood (Frantz & Bennigson, 2005). 
 Not surprisingly, research has shown that good relationship history, high 
initial levels of trust, and low probability of further transgressions is related to higher 
effectiveness of apologies (Bottom et al., 2002; Tomlinson et al., 2004). Nevertheless, 
the main effect of perceived sincerity of the apology is relatively stronger than 
relationship history, initial trust, or probability of recidivism (Tomlinson et al., 2004). 
 Many authors assume gender differences. For example, Lazarus (2004) argued 
that women apologize more, are more interested in apologies, and that they are also 
more likely to feel guilty, while apologizing can be perceived as dishonorable for 
males. However, Schumann and Ross (2010) questioned this assumption. Their 
studies showed that while women apologize more often and their apologies are more 
complex, this difference can be explained by women's increased sensitivity to 
transgressions and taking offense. In other words, authors explain the observed 
differences in frequency and complexity of apology by the fact that women perceive 
transgressions as more severe. When the levels of perceived severity of transgression 
are equal, men and women are equally likely to apologize and to use equally complex 
apology. 
 Cultural background has been shown to have an effect on several aspects of 
apology (Barnlund & Yoshioka, 1990). For example, Han and Cai (2010) found that 
Chinese American show higher face-related concerns even at low levels of 
responsibility as compared to Americans of European origin. Face is social value or 
respect an individual claims form others (Goffman, 2003). From this perspective, 
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members of collectivist cultures should value social approval (positive face), while 
individualist cultures should be focused on autonomy (negative face; e.g., Oetzel & 
Ting-Toomey, 2003). Nevertheless, the obtained pattern of results did not simply 
confirm assumptions about Chinese collectivism, because Chinese participants were 
significantly more concerned about their and other party's autonomy and not social 
approval, as compared to Americans. Authors interpret these results as an evidence 
that intercultural research needs more complex concepts of individualism and 
collectivism. In addition, some research suggests that cultural differences in the effect 
of apology are caused by differences in cognitive representation of transgression as 
well as of the consequent conflict (Gelfand et al., 2001). Ultimately, cultures are 
bound to differ in what is recognized as a norm, transgression, and in the remedial 
devices that are available to the involved parties (Goffman, 1971). 
 This brief review of relevant literature shows that the effect of apology is not a 
simple process. Clearly, many situational factors can have a major effect on the 
effectiveness of apology. This paper is investigating whether facial appearance can be 
included amongst these factors. 
 
Chapter 9: Role of Facial Dominance 
 In this paper, we propose that some facial features, more specifically facial 
dominance, have moderating effect on the effectiveness of apology. Research has 
shown that people create relatively complex impressions of a person based on his or 
her facial features (e.g., Hassin & Trope, 2000; Noor & Evans, 2003), which has a 
great influence on their behavior towards that person. For example, Todorov with his 
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colleagues were able to predict election outcomes based on the facial features of the 
candidates (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). In addition, some research 
suggests that people create these impressions at a single glance at the person (Willis 
& Todorov, 2006). After being overlooked for some time, this area of research is 
finally beginning to attract the attention of apology scholars. For example, Hareli, 
Sharabi, Cossette, and Hess (2011) found that people with dominant facial features 
are perceived as being less probable to experience regret and shame after failure or 
transgression, and they are also perceived as less likely to apologize. This effect was 
independent of objective social status indicators. 
 Dominance seems to be a universally salient trait perceived in human faces. 
For example, Perrett with colleagues (1998) in their classical study showed that there 
is a close relationship between testosterone-induced masculinity of face (Penton-Voak 
& Chen, 2004) and perceived dominance, regardless of the cultural background of the 
respondents. Typically, dominant (masculine) faces have strong jaws, prominent 
chins, broad cheekbones, heavy brow ridges, and have overall larger facial width-to-
height ratio (Burnstein & Branigan, 2001; Carré & McCormick, 2008; Mazur & 
Booth, 1998).  People with high facial dominance are more driven to obtain and 
maintain high social status (Muller & Mazur, 1997), which facilitates their acquisition 
of managerial positions (Alrajih & Ward, 2013; Mueller & Mazur, 1996). In addition, 
they are preferred leaders in the times of conflict, crisis, and unrest (Little, Burriss, 
Jones, & Roberts, 2007), and as group members they are willing to make higher 
sacrifices on behalf of the group to assure collective success (Stirrat & Perrett, 2012). 
However, people with these faces are also perceived as characterized by lower 
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emotionality, honesty, and cooperativeness (Perrett et al., 1998), while more feminine 
faces are perceived as having opposite characteristics. Indeed, higher testosterone 
level, which is responsible for masculine features of human faces, is also related to 
lower empathy (Hermans, Putman, & van Honk, 2006) and increased incidence of 
dominant and antisocial behavior (Mazur & Booth, 1998). Also, a larger facial width-
to-height ratio was shown to be associated with higher incidence of aggressive (Carré 
& McCormick, 2008), deceptive, and unethical behavior (Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012). 
With this evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that the negative impression of people 
with dominant faces is an adaptation, whose function is to protect from the 
testosterone-induced tendency to act antisocially (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
 Facial dominance clearly influences one's impression, and to the extent that 
apologies are means of impression management, facial dominance is likely to interact 
with the effects of components of apology. In other words, facial dominance of the 
offender will systematically influence subjective accounts of apology and its overall 
effectiveness. The first line of reasoning about this problem can start with the fact that 
people with dominant faces are perceived as less likely to experience regret, shame 
and also less likely to apologize (Hareli et al., 2011). Shame and regret are one of the 
sources of motivation for apology (Lazare, 2004) and consequently people with 
dominant faces are perceived as chronically undermotivated to apologize. Therefore, 
the fact that a person with high facial dominance apologized could mean that his or 
her motivation to apologize had to be relatively high, which is an indicator of genuine 
intent. In addition, if people high on facial dominance are perceived as less likely to 
apologize, then receiving an apology form them should be unexpected. This would be 
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in agreement with Long and Becke's assertion (2003) that unexpected apologies are 
perceived as more reliable signals of commitment to the relationship. Similarly, 
apologizing is also perceived as a submissive behavior (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) and it presents a self-imposed restriction on one’s social 
power (Anderson et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2008). Therefore such action is more 
costly for a person who otherwise behaves in a dominant way (Mazur & Booth, 1998) 
and who is driven to pursue and maintain high social status (Muller & Mazur, 1997). 
This higher cost can be perceived as a reliable measure of commitment to the 
relationship with the victim (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Long & Becke, 2003; Zahavi, 
1975). Even in other primates, dominant group members are more likely to reconcile 
after aggression only to restore high value social relationship (De Waal, 2000), so the 
tendency to reconcile can be perceived as a measure of aggressor's perceived value of 
the relationship. To summarize, apologies of people with high facial dominance are 
likely to be more unexpected and costly for the offender and therefore more reliable 
signals of the offender's commitment to the relationship. As a result they will be more 
effective in terms of impression management and reconciliation. Within signaling 
theory framework, reliability of a signal is an underlying mechanism that drives the 
change in behavior of the receiver of the signal (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984; Long & 
Becke, 2003; Zahavi, 1975). In our model, the perceived reliability of the signal 
manifests in victim's perceived sincerity of the apology (e.g., Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 
2009). This means that the apology of people with dominant faces will be manifested 
in the increase of victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
H1a: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be more effective as compared to 
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people with low dominant faces. 
 
 The second line of reasoning starts with the finding that people with dominant 
faces are perceived as being less honest, less cooperative, less empathetic (Perrett et 
al., 1998) and therefore less likely to experience regret and shame (Hareli et al., 
2011). There is also evidence suggesting that people with dominant faces are indeed 
carriers of these traits(Haselhuhn & Wong, 2012; Hermans et al., 2006; Mazur & 
Booth, 1998). For these reasons, apology coming from people high in facial 
dominance might be less reliable as a signal of their commitment to the relationship. 
Research in signaling theory has shown that situations where signal becomes less 
reliable lead to a pressure on receivers of the signal to be more skeptical and less 
likely to respond positively to the signal (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). Similarly, people 
should be more skeptical and suspicious about the reliability of signals coming from 
people with high facial dominance. In other words, apologies of people with 
dominant faces will be more likely perceived as manipulative strategies. This will 
decrease the perceived sincerity of their apology, which will in turn lead to decrease 
in the effectiveness of apology in trust repair and impression management of the 
offender (Tomlinson et al., 2004).  
 
H1b: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be less effective as compared to 
people with low dominant faces. 
 
 Given the above predictions about the effectiveness of the apology, it will be 
of interest to investigate which component of apology should be used by a person 
with highly dominant facial features. This question has very obvious practical 
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implications. For example, research has shown that people with dominant faces tend 
to occupy managerial positions (Alrajih & Ward, 2013; Mueller & Mazur, 1996), and 
therefore they find themselves in situations where they represent interests of whole 
companies or teams and might be required to resolve potential conflicts. As a result, 
their ability to apologize and restore trust can be essential for functioning of 
organizations and business relationships (Aquino et al., 2003). 
 In order to make these comparisons, we will use cognitive component as a 
reference point, because it presents the most basic component of apology (Schlenker 
& Darby, 1981). It should also be noted that these predictions are of rather tentative 
and exploratory character. To create concrete predictions about each component, we 
should first consider the above-described main effect of facial dominance on the 
effectiveness of apology. If the apology of people with high facial dominance is more 
effective because it is unexpected (Long & Becke, 2003), then this effect should be 
stronger in empathy component. This is caused by the fact that people with dominant 
faces are less likely to experience regret, shame and empathy (Hareli et al., 2011), 
which will make the use of this component less expected than the use of cognitive 
component. And since unexpectedness is one of the factors that increases the 
reliability and consequently the effectiveness of apology, then emotional components 
should be more effective than cognitive components in people with high facial 
dominance. 
 
H2a: Empathy components of apology will be more effective than cognitive 
components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
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Alternatively, if apologies of people with high facial dominance are perceived as 
manipulative strategies, then this skepticism will be even increased in the case of 
empathy components, because people with high facial dominance are perceived as 
unlikely to experience guilt, shame or empathy (Hareli et al., 2011). 
 
H2b: Empathy components of apology will be less effective than cognitive 
components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H2c: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and empathy 
component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
 As we have already mentioned, submissive behavior is more costly for people 
with dominant faces (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Muller & Mazur, 1997). The 
central aspect of empowering component of apology is to put the victim in the 
position of power over the offender (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), and therefore 
empowering component will be more costly for people with dominant faces as 
compared to cognitive component of apology. And seeing that costliness is one of the 
sources of reliability of a signal within signaling theory framework (Long & Brecke, 
2003, Zahavi, 1975), empowering component of apology should be perceived as more 
reliable and therefore to be more effective in trust restoration as compared to 
cognitive component of apology. 
 
H3a: Empowering components of apology will be more effective than cognitive 
component in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
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dominance. 
H3b: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and empowering 
component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
 At last, research has repeatedly shown that offer of compensation has the 
relatively strongest effect on reconciliation and offender's impression improvement 
(R. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Lewicki & Polin, 2012; Scher & Darley, 1997; Schlenker 
& Darby, 1981; Schmitt et al., 2004). Moreover, the amount of compensation offered 
by the offender can be used as a measure of honest intention and commitment to the 
relationship, as predicted by signaling theory. Ohtsubo and Watanabe (2009) indeed 
found a close relationship between the amount of compensation offered and perceived 
sincerity of the apology. For these reasons we predict that compensating component 
of apology will be more effective in people with dominant faces, as compared to 
cognitive component. 
 
H4a: Compensating components of apology will be more effective than cognitive 
component in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H4b: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and 
compensating component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the 
apology. 
 
 Offer of compensation makes an ideal signal because the amount of 
compensation offered is a cost for the offender that can be a testable and therefore 
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reliable measure of the offender's commitment to the relationship. In addition, 
research has shown that in many cases, the mere offer of compensation leads to 
impression improvement and trust repair, without the victim actually accepting the 
offer (Bottom et al., 2002). However, the acceptance of the offer of compensation can 
serve as additional test of the offender's commitment to the relationship. In other 
words, the readiness of the offender to follow through with the offer of compensation 
can serve as a measure of the offender's commitment. We speculate that depending on 
the nature of the main effect of facial dominance on the effectiveness of apology 
(investigated in H1), victims will either be less likely to accept the offered 
compensation if the apology will be perceived as unexpected and therefore more 
sincere, or more likely to accept the offered compensation in case the apology is 
perceived as a manipulative strategy, so the reliability of the signal can be tested 
(Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). 
 
H4c: Compensation offered by people with dominant faces will be less likely to be 
accepted by the victims, as compared to offenders with less dominant faces. 
 
H4d: Compensation offered by people with dominant faces will be more likely to be 
accepted by the victims, as compared to offenders with less dominant faces. 
 
Chapter 10: Pilot Studies 
Pilot study 1 
 Pilot study 1 was designed to develop materials needed for manipulation of 
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high and low facial dominance. For this purpose, 11 male pictures from the CAS-
PEAL large-scale Chinese face database (Gao et al., 2008)  were selected, 6 of high 
face width-to-height and 5 of low width-to-height ratio to represent 6 high and 5 low 
dominance pictures (e.g., Burnstein & Branigan, 2001; Carré & McCormick, 2008). 
These pictures were rated on scales measuring perceived dominance, attractiveness, 
intelligence, and age. 
 
Participants. 49 participants, 14 males and 35 females, average age of 21.65 
years (SD = 1.67) were recruited from Singapore Management University 
undergraduates in exchange for course credits. 
 Procedure and measures. After accepting the informed consent, participants 
were given a link to the online survey. In the survey, they rated 11 pictures of faces in 
terms of perceived dominance, attractiveness, intelligence and age. Perceived 
dominance was measured by 2 items “Overall, how dominant/submissive is the 
person on the picture?”, attractiveness by 2 items “Overall, how attractive/good 
looking is the person on the picture?", and intelligence by 2 items “Overall, how 
intelligent/competent is the person on the picture?”, all rated on 7-point scales (1 = 
Not at all, 7 = Extremely so). Perceived age was measured by an open-ended 
question. 
 Facial stimuli. 11 male pictures from the CAS-PEAL large-scale Chinese face 
database (Gao et al., 2008) were selected, 6 of high face width-to-height and 5 low 
width-to-height ratio to represent 6 high and 5 low dominance pictures. Only photos 
with symmetrical faces, neutral facial expression and no facial hair or accessories 
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were included. 
Results 
The purpose of pilot study 1 was to select manipulation material for high and 
low facial dominance. This was achieved by selecting a group of 4 pictures that 
scored low on perceived dominance and 4 pictures that scored high on perceived 
dominance, while being equivalent in perceived age, attractiveness, and intelligence. 
Our analysis identified 8 suitable pictures that you can see on Figure 1. Planned 
repeated measures contrasts were used to compare these two groups of pictures. Our 
analysis showed that high facial dominance group scored significantly higher in 
perceived dominance than low facial dominance, t(528) = 10.28, p < .000. At the 
same time, these two groups did not differ in perceived age, t(528) = .50, p = .960, 
perceived attractiveness, t(528) = -.48, p = .632, and perceived intelligence, t(528) = -
.97, p = .332. Thus, these two groups of pictures met requirements for manipulation 
of high and low facial dominance. 
 
Pilot study 2 
 The purpose of pilot study 2 was to develop scenarios that would be 
representative of workplace transgressions and also to make sure that these scenarios 
do not induce some ceiling or floor effect in their distribution of perceive 
intentionality and severity of the depicted transgression. For this purpose, we 
developed 6 transgression scenarios, refer to Appendix B. These scenarios will later 
serve to manipulate transgressions. While the previous studies already tested 
scenarios for similar manipulation (e.g., Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Scher & Darley, 
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1997; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, & Montada, 2004), we wanted to include more 
work-relevant setting where victim of transgression is also the target of apology. It is 
likely that the nature of the relationships in the workplace can be more formal and 
that different social norms will be more salient as compared to more informal setting 
(R. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). For this reason we developed scenarios with work-related 
transgressions so our findings can be directly applicable for organizational setting. 
This also brings the issue of the scope of transgressions in organizational context. 
Aquino, Tripp, and Bies (2006) identified three characteristics of workplace 
transgressions: goal obstruction; violation of rules, norms, and promises; and status 
and power derogation. For our studies, we developed six scenarios that each covered 
all the three characteristics so the scope of transgressions can be more representative 
of the actual workplace environment.  
Participants. 143 participants, 45 males and 98 females, average age of 20.9 
years (SD = 1.58) were recruited from Singapore Management University 
undergraduates in exchange for course credits. 
 Procedure and measures. After accepting the informed consent form, 
participants were given a link to the online survey. The survey contained 6 scenarios 
developed to cover the most common categories of transgression in the workplace 
identified by Aquino, Tripp, and Bies (2006), please refer to Appendix A for the text 
of the scenarios. Under each transgression scenario there was a list of 15 items that 
were rated on 5-point scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). Perceived 
severity of transgression was measured by statements like “The colleague's action 
was serious.” and perceived intentionality by statements such as “The colleague's 
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action was intentional.” Each of the three characteristics of transgressions defined by 
Aquino et al. (2006) was measured by 3 statements. An example of goal obstruction 
item is "The colleague's action was blocking my progress.", norm violation was 
assessed by items such as "The colleague's action crossed the standards of 
professionalism.", and an example of power derogation items is "The colleague's 
action humiliated me."  
Results 
The purpose of this pilot study was to identify 2 scenarios that are matching in 
terms of the dispersion of perceived severity and intentionality. In addition, these 2 
scenarios should each cover all 3 categories of workplace transgressions proposed by 
Aquino et al. (2006). Investigation of descriptive statistics, graphs, and consequent t-
tests revealed Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 as best meeting the requirements about the 
dispersion of perceived severity and intentionality of the described transgression. 
Histograms did not reveal any floor or ceiling effect in in perceived severity and 
intentionality in both scenarios. Repeated measure t-test showed that Scenario 1 and 2 
do not differ in their severity, t(142) = -.79, p = .432. However, these two scenarios 
differ in terms of perceived intentionality, t(142) = -2.87, p < .01, which will be 
addressed by appropriate counterbalancing in the consequent studies. 
To investigate whether the two scenarios cover all 3 categories of workplace 
transgressions proposed by Aquino et al. (2006), we conducted series of one-sample t-
tests. The test value of these one-sample t-tests was equal to 9. This number was 
selected for the following reason: each of the categories was measured by 3 items on 
5-point scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree), where rating of 3 stands for 
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"Neither agree not disagree". This means that cumulative scores from 3 items which 
equals to 9 describes a situation where the participant cannot decide whether the 
particular category is present in the scenario. Therefore, cumulative score that is 
higher than 9 indicate perceived presence of the particular transgression category in 
the scenario. The performed analysis showed that both scenarios significantly cover 
all 3 characteristics of workplace transgressions proposed by Aquino et al. (2006), 
refer to Table 2 for details. 
 
Pilot study 3a 
 Pilot study 3a was designed to test the assumption that there are 4 distinct 
components of apology. For this purpose we developed 19 items that cover the scope 
of the identified components of apology. We started with 14 items that were 
developed by Fehr and Gelfand (2010) in order to test their 3 components of apology: 
offer of compensation, expression of empathy, and acknowledgment of transgressed 
rule. In order to test our hypotheses we also included items measuring empowering 
component. These items were newly developed. 
 Participants. 52 participants, 15 males and 37 females, of average age of 
21.62 years (SD = 1.66) were recruited from Singapore Management University 
undergraduates in exchange for course credits. 
 Procedure and measures. After accepting the informed consent form, 
participants were given link to the online survey. Participants' task was to rate what a 
good apology should include. The survey consisted of 19 statements describing 
different aspects of apology, which were rated on 5-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 
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5 = Strongly agree). Each statement was introduced by a phrase “In general, a good 
apology should include...”, which was followed by the 19 items describing content of 
the four proposed components of apology. Cognitive component items consisted of 5 
statements measuring acknowledgment of and taking responsibility for transgression, 
such as “[In general, a good apology should include] an admission that he/she did not 
live up to the standards of the group.” Empathy subcategory consisted of 5 
statements, for example “[In general, a good apology should include] an expression of 
great concern for my suffering.” Compensating component was represented by 5 
statements, such as “[In general, a good apology should include] an offer to 
compensate me for what happened.” All these items were adopted form Fehr and 
Gelfand's (2010) study. At last, newly developed empowering component measure 
consisted of 5 statements, such as “[In general, a good apology should include] an 
expression of humility in front of me” or “humble and submissive formulations.” 
Results 
 To confirm the distinctiveness of the four apology components, exploratory 
factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation procedure and varimax rotation 
was conducted (R. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). The results showed 4 distinct factors of 
cognitive, empathy, compensating, and empowering components, factor loadings of 
individual items can be seen in Table 3. The four scales showed reliability scores of α 
= .904 for compensating component, α = .866 for empathy component, α = .899 
cognitive component, and α = .837 for empowering component. 
 
Pilot study 3b 
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The purpose of this pilot study was to validate statements that will be used to 
manipulate the 4 components of apology in the subsequent studies. To achieve this, 
all 4 manipulation statements were rated as to what degree they express the 4 
components as measured by the scales developed in Pilot study 3a. 
Participants. 52 participants, 15 males and 37 females, of average age of 
21.62 years (SD = 1.66) were recruited from Singapore Management University 
undergraduates in exchange for course credits. 
Procedure and measures. After accepting the informed consent form, 
participants were given link to the online survey. The survey consisted of 4 different 
parts, each part presenting statement expressing one component of the apology. This 
statement was then rated on the items in Table 3. For example, when cognitive 
manipulation was validated, participants were introduced to the task by "Statement 'It 
was wrong and it was my fault.' expresses...", followed by the items from Table 3 that 
were rated on 5-point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). It is expected 
that cognitive manipulation statement should rate higher on the relevant items as 
compared to other components of apology. This procedure was repeated 4 times with 
different manipulation statements. Cognitive component was manipulated as "It was 
wrong and it was my fault."; compensating component as "I would like to make it up 
to you – what would it take so you could trust me again?"; empowering component as 
"Can you please forgive me?", and empathy component as "I see how this made you 
feel." 
Results 
 To validate manipulation statements of the four components, we compared 
39 
 
 
whether each manipulation statement scored higher on a scale measuring the 
particular component as compared to scales measuring different components.  
Therefore, we calculated weighed scores of cognitive, empathy, compensating, and 
empowering component for each of the manipulation statements and compared these 
scores by repeated-measures general linear model analysis. For example, when we 
validated cognitive manipulation statements, we took the ratings as to what degree the 
manipulation statement expresses the 19 items from Table 3. Note that these 19 items 
are essentially 4 scales measuring different components of apology. Therefore, we 
calculated weighed1 scores of the 4 scales for, in this case, cognitive manipulation 
statement. The assumption is that cognitive manipulation statement should score 
higher on the scale measuring cognitive component as compared to the scales 
measuring other components. This assumption was tested by repeated-measures 
general linear model analysis. 
  The results showed that empowering manipulation statement expressed 
significantly more empowering component as compared to cognitive, compensating, 
and empathy components, for details refer to Table 4. This constitutes successful 
validation of statement "Can you please forgive me?" as a manipulation of 
empowering component. Similarly, pairwise comparisons showed that compensating 
manipulation statement expressed significantly more compensating component, 
cognitive manipulation statement expressed significantly more cognitive component, 
and empathy manipulation statement expressed significantly more empathy 
component. This means that all four statements were successfully validated as 
manipulations of the relevant components of apology. 
                                                 
1 We weighed the scores because not all the scales consist of the same number of items. 
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Chapter 11: Study 1 
 This study was designed to test our hypotheses about the relationship between 
facial dominance and the effectiveness of different components of apology. The study 
was 2 (dominant faced transgressor vs. non dominant faced transgressor) x 4 (four 
different types of apologies) within-person design where each individual was rating 
the trustworthiness and willingness to reconcile in the eight different situations. 
Specifically, the two workplace transgression scenarios developed in the pilot study 2 
were used. Each of the scenarios was accompanied by one of the four facial stimuli 
pictures in dominance condition and one of the four low dominant pictures in low 
dominance condition. After reading the scenarios, four types of apology representing 
the identified 4 components of apology were presented, followed by the ratings of 
trustworthiness and willingness to reconciliation (i.e., the indicators of apology 
effectiveness). 
 Participants. 156 participants, 49 males and 107 females, of average age of 
21.4 (SD = 1.86) were recruited from Singapore Management University 
undergraduates in exchange for course credits. 81.4 % described themselves as 
Chinese, 2.6% as Malay, 9% as Indian, and 6.5% as other2. 
 Procedure and measures. After arriving to the lab and accepting the 
informed consent form, participants were given link to the online survey. In this 
survey they read 2 transgression scenarios in random order. Each of the scenarios was 
presented with a randomly assigned picture of a face either high or low on facial 
                                                 
2 Out of the 10 participants that identified themselves as "Others", 3 were Vietnamese, 3 Korean, 2 
Eurasian, 1 Javanese, and 1 Caucasian. 
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dominance features. These faces were from the picture set created in pilot study 1. 
Each scenario was also accompanied by four types of offender's apologies, 
representing four components of apology. These apologies were validated in pilot 
study 3b. “I am sorry, it was wrong and it was my fault.” represents cognitive 
component, “I am sorry, I see how this made you feel.” represents empathy 
component, “I am sorry, can you please forgive me?” represented empowering 
component, and “I am sorry, I would like to make it up to you – what would it take so 
you could trust me again?” represents compensating component.  This constituted 2 
(high vs. low facial dominance) x 4 components of apology within subject design. 
 The exact presentation was as follows. After reading the manipulation 
scenario with the offender's face, participants rated statements measuring their 
perception of the transgression. In other words, they rated scales measuring severity 
and intentionality of the transgression, the same 4 items as in pilot study 2 rated on 7-
point scale (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree).  Then four different 
transgressor's apologies were consecutively presented in random order and 
participants rated statements measuring their perception of the apology, the 
trustworthiness of the offender, and willingness to reconcile. More specifically, 
participants rated the perceived sincerity measure consisting of two items, such as 
“The colleague's reaction was sincere." This was rated on 5-point scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). This was followed by three items of Transgressor's 
Trustworthiness scale (Desmet et al., 2011b), which consists of questions such as 
“Based on the reaction, do you think the colleague is trustworthy?” rated on 7-point 
scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Extremely so). Further, respondents rated three items of 
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Willingness to Reconcile the Relationship scale (Tomlinson et al., 2004). This 
measure consists of items like “Given the colleague's actions, I am willing to let the 
colleague to try to reconcile our relationship,” rated on 7-point scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). This was repeated for four times for each component 
statement, and then the whole procedure was repeated for the second scenario. 
 Two different dependent variables were used in the current study in order to 
tap the effectiveness of different types of apologies. First, transgressor's 
trustworthiness was measured because it is frequently used in the apology research 
(e.g., Desmet, De Cremer, & van Dijk, 2011), as it is related to impression 
management, which is the most influential framework in the field (e.g., Scher & 
Darley, 1997). Also, willingness to reconcile was included because it is a frequent 
measure of trust repair (Tomlinson et al., 2004) and as such it is close to the 
behavioral measures that will be used in Study 2. 
 In the end, participants filled in a set of the following individual difference 
measures: 16-item Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (Triandis 
& Gelfand, 1998), 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), Levels of 
Self-concept scale (Selenta & Lord, 2005), and Implicit Theory of Morality scale 
(Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997). The whole procedure took no longer than 30 
minutes. 
  
Results. 
Before the analysis itself, we excluded all participants that did not pass 
attention control to make sure that all data in our analysis is collected from 
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participants that read the instructions carefully. This control consisted of one item 
what was presented as a part of 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 
1999), where the participant was instructed to select "Strongly Agree". After 
excluding all participants that did not pass attention control question, data from 117 
participants, 36 males and 81 females, of average age of 21.5 (SD = 1.86) were used 
for consequent analyses. 
 First, relevant scores of the above-described scales were calculated. Perceived 
severity of transgressions showed reliability α = .856, perceived intentionality of the 
transgression α = .950, sincerity of the response α = .978, perceived trustworthiness α 
= .940, and willingness to reconcile scale showed reliability of α = .909. 
 The inspection of the correlation Table 5 showed that perceived intentionality 
of the transgression was negatively related to perceived sincerity of the apology (rhigh 
dominance, cognitive = -0.35 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, compensating = -0.29 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, 
empowering = -0.35 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, empathy = -0.32 , p < .01; rlow dominance, cognitive = -
0.26 , p < .01; rlow dominance, compensating = -0.23 , p < .05; rlow dominance, empowering = -0.37 , p 
< .01; rlow dominance, empathy = -0.21 , p < .05), trustworthiness of the offender  (rhigh 
dominance, cognitive = -0.32 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, compensating = -0.27 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, 
empowering = -0.32 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, empathy = -0.33 , p < .01; rlow dominance, cognitive = -
0.30 , p < .01; rlow dominance, compensating = -0.31 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empowering = -0.36 , p 
< .01; rlow dominance, empathy = -0.38 , p < .01), and willingness to reconcile with the 
offender (rhigh dominance, cognitive = -0.35 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, compensating = -0.37 , p < .01; 
rhigh dominance, empowering = -0.43 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, empathy = -0.36 , p < .01; rlow 
dominance, cognitive = -0.44 , p < .01; rlow dominance, compensating = -0.36 , p < .01; rlow dominance, 
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empowering = -0.40 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empathy = -0.36 , p < .01) in both high and low 
dominance faces, and all apology components. Perceived severity overall did not 
show significant relationship with these outcomes (rreconciliation, high dominance, cognitive = -
0.14, n.s.;rreconciliation, high dominance, compensating = -0.01, n.s.;rreconciliation, high dominance, 
empowering = -0.12, n.s.;rreconciliation, high dominance, empathy = -0.18, n.s.;rreconciliation, low dominance, 
cognitive = -0.16, n.s.;rreconciliation, low dominance, compensating = 0.03, n.s.;rreconciliation, low dominance, 
empowering = -0.06, n.s.;rreconciliation, low dominance, empathy = -0.15, n.s.;rsincerity, high dominance, 
cognitive = -0.11, n.s.;rsincerity, high dominance, compensating = 0.00, n.s.;rsincerity, high dominance, 
empowering = -0.09, n.s.;rsincerity, high dominance, empathy = -0.06, n.s.;rsincerity, low dominance, cognitive 
= -0.02, n.s.;rsincerity, low dominance, compensating = 0.17, n.s.;rsincerity, low dominance, empowering = -
0.01, n.s.;rsincerity, low dominance, empathy = -0.09, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, high dominance, cognitive = -0.19, 
p < .05;rtrustworthiness, high dominance, compensating = -0.09, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, high dominance, 
empowering = -0.16, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, high dominance, empathy = -0.21, p < .05;rtrustworthiness, low 
dominance, cognitive = -0.17, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, low dominance, compensating = -0.07, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, 
low dominance, empowering = -0.12, n.s.;rtrustworthiness, low dominance, empathy = -0.21, p < .05). 
Further, perceived sincerity of apology consistently showed positive relationship with 
perceived trustworthiness of the transgressor (rhigh dominance, cognitive = 0.72 , p < .01; rhigh 
dominance, compensating = 0.68 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, empowering = 0.67 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, 
empathy = 0.70 , p < .01; rlow dominance, cognitive = 0.67 , p < .01; rlow dominance, compensating = 
0.62 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empowering = 0.66 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empathy = 0.62 , p < 
.01) and victim's willingness to reconcile with him (rhigh dominance, cognitive = 0.54 , p < 
.01; rhigh dominance, compensating = 0.80 , p < .01; rhigh dominance, empowering = 0.80 , p < .01; rhigh 
dominance, empathy = 0.86 , p < .01; rlow dominance, cognitive = 0.74 , p < .01; rlow dominance, 
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compensating = 0.71 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empowering = 0.82 , p < .01; rlow dominance, empathy = 
0.73). 
 We also uncovered some interesting patterns in individual differences. 
Notably, while implicit theory of morality showed no relationship with perceived 
severity and intentionality of the transgression, it was negatively related to perceived 
trustworthiness of the transgressor (rlow dominance, cognitive = -0.32, p < .01; rlow dominance, 
compensating = -0.25, p < .01; rlow dominance, empowering = -0.21, p < .05; rlow dominance, empathy = -
0.35, p < .01; rhigh dominance, cognitive = -0.22, p < .05; rhigh dominance, compensating = 0.00, n.s.; 
rhigh dominance, empowering = -0.24, p < .01; rhigh dominance, empathy = -0.23, p < .05), and 
willingness to reconcile (rlow dominance, cognitive = -0.23, p < .05; rlow dominance, compensating = -
0.18, p < .05; rlow dominance, empowering = -0.13, n.s.; rlow dominance, empathy = -0.25, p < .01; 
rhigh dominance, cognitive = -0.16, n.s.; rhigh dominance, compensating = 0.01, n.s.; rhigh dominance, 
empowering = -0.15, n.s.; rhigh dominance, empathy = -0.13, n.s.). As we can see from the 
regression coefficients, this pattern was stronger for transgressors with low 
dominance faces. This indicates that entity theorists of morality (people who believe 
that person's moral character is rather given and unchangeable) perceive apologies as 
less trustworthy and they are less likely to reconcile with them. The pattern also 
shows that entity theorists of morality are harsher in their judgment of transgressors 
with low dominance faces. 
 
Hypotheses testing 
First, we tested whether the facial dominance of the transgressor influences 
perceived severity and intentionality of the transgression to determine whether our 
46 
 
 
further analyses have to control for these factors. Repeated-measures t-test showed 
that transgression scenarios of colleagues with highly and low dominant faces were 
perceived as of the same severity t(116) = .42, n.s. and intentionality t(116) = .157, 
n.s. This justifies our not using these two factors in the consequent analyses. 
 
H1a: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be more effective as compared to 
people with low dominant faces. 
H1b: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be less effective as compared to 
people with low dominant faces. 
 
To test our hypotheses about the effect of facial dominance on the effect of 
apology, we conducted two two-way repeated measures ANOVAs. First, we used the 
perceived trustworthiness of the transgressor as a dependent variable and we used 2 
within-subject factors: dominance (high vs. low) and component of apology 
(cognitive vs. compensating vs. empowering vs. empathy). Here, our analysis did not 
show any main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .324, p = .57, n.s., which 
means that neither of our hypotheses H1a and H1b were supported. Next, we 
conducted the same analysis, but this time we used willingness to reconcile as a 
dependent variable. Replicating our earlier results, our analysis did not show any 
main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .993, p = .32, n.s., which means that our 
hypotheses H1a and H1b were not supported. 
 
H2a: Empathy components of apology will be more effective than cognitive 
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components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H2b: Empathy components of apology will be less effective than cognitive 
components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H2c: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and empathy 
component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
To investigate what our data may reveal about moderating effect of facial 
dominance on the effect of components of apology, we again conducted two two-way 
repeated measures ANOVAs. First, we used the perceived trustworthiness of the 
transgressor as a dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, our analysis did not show 
any main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .324, p = .57, n.s. For the main effect 
of different components of apology, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 19.20, p = .002, therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .93). The results show 
that there was a significant effect of component of apology on the transgressor's 
trustworthiness, F(2.78, 322.10) = 46.89, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
empathy component is significantly less effective than cognitive, for details please 
refer to Table 6. 
More importantly for our hypotheses, the analysis also revealed significant 
interaction between facial dominance and component of apology F(3, 348) = 3.75, p 
= .01, which suggests a moderating effect of facial dominance on the relationship 
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between component of apology and transgressor's trustworthiness. The plot of 
estimated marginal means suggests that the way transgressor's facial dominance 
influences the degree to which compensating component of apology improves 
transgressor's trustworthiness is responsible for observed interactions effect, refer to 
Figure 2. This would suggest that there is no interaction effect of facial dominance in 
our target empathy component of apology. Indeed, series of repeated measures t-tests 
did not revealed any differences in the effectiveness of empathy and cognitive 
components caused by transgressor's facial dominance, refer to Table 7 for details. 
These results are incongruent with our hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
Next, we conducted the same set of analyses, but this time we used 
willingness to reconcile as a dependent variable. To test our hypotheses we conducted 
second set of two-way repeated measures ANOVA. Replicating our earlier results, our 
analysis did not show any main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .993, p = .32, 
n.s. For the main effect of different components of apology, Mauchly’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(5) = 24.40, p < .001, therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = 
.98). The results show that there was a significant effect of component of apology on 
the willingness to reconcile, F(2.70, 313.36) = 47.93, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons 
replicated earlier results, showing that cognitive component was more effective than 
empathy component in increasing the willingness to reconcile with the transgressor, 
for details please refer to Table 8. 
The only difference from the earlier set of analyses is that there is no 
significant interaction between facial dominance and component of apology F(3, 348) 
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= .80, p = .50, which suggests no moderating effect of facial dominance on the 
relationship between component of apology and willingness to reconcile with the 
transgressor. This result is also inconsistent with our hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
The lack of interaction effect of facial dominance in our target empathy 
component of apology did not allow us to test H2c that perceived sincerity would be 
an underlying mechanism of this difference.  
 
H3a: Empowering components of apology will be more effective then cognitive 
component in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H3b: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and empowering 
component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
To test these hypotheses, we used the same two two-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs as described earlier. First, we used the perceived trustworthiness of the 
transgressor as dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, our analysis did not show 
any main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .324, p = .57, n.s., and there was a 
significant effect of component of apology on the transgressor's trustworthiness, 
F(2.78, 322.10) = 46.89, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that empowering 
component is significantly less effective than cognitive, for details please refer to 
Table 6. 
The analysis also revealed significant interaction between facial dominance 
and component of apology F(3, 348) = 3.75, p = .01. However, series of repeated 
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measures t-tests did not revealed any differences in the effectiveness of empowering 
component caused by transgressor's facial dominance, refer to Table 7 for details. 
These results are incongruent with our hypothesis H3a. 
 The same set of analyses with willingness to reconcile as a dependent 
variable showed no main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .993, p = .32, n.s., 
and significant effect of component of apology, F(2.70, 313.36) = 47.93, p < .001. 
Pairwise comparisons replicated earlier results, showing that empowering component 
was less effective than cognitive component in increasing the willingness to reconcile 
with the transgressor, for details please refer to Table 8. In addition, there was no 
significant interaction between facial dominance and component of apology F(3, 348) 
= .80, p = .50, which suggests no moderating effect of facial dominance on the 
relationship between component of apology and willingness to reconcile with the 
transgressor. This result is also inconsistent with our hypothesis H3a. 
The lack of interaction effect of facial dominance in our target empowering 
component of apology did not allow us to test H3b that perceived sincerity would be 
an underlying mechanism of this difference.  
 
H4a: Compensating components of apology will be more effective then cognitive 
component in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H4b: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and 
compensating component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the 
apology. 
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To test these hypotheses, we used the same two two-way repeated measures 
ANOVAs as described earlier. First, we used the perceived trustworthiness of the 
transgressor as a dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, our analysis did not show 
any main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .324, p = .57, n.s., and there was a 
significant effect of component of apology on the transgressor's trustworthiness, 
F(2.78, 322.10) = 46.89, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons showed that compensating 
component is significantly more effective than cognitive, for details please refer to 
Table 6. 
The analysis also revealed significant interaction between facial dominance 
and component of apology F(3, 348) = 3.75, p = .01. The plot of estimated marginal 
means suggests that the way transgressor's facial dominance influences the degree to 
which compensating component of apology improves transgressor's trustworthiness is 
responsible for observed interactions effect, refer to Figure 2. Indeed, repeated 
measures t-test of simple effects showed that compensating component is 
significantly more effective in improving impression when used by transgressor with 
highly dominant features, t(116) = 2.15, p = .03. This finding supports our hypothesis 
H4a. 
 The same set of analyses with willingness to reconcile as a dependent variable 
showed no main effect of facial dominance F(1, 116) = .993, p = .32, n.s., and 
significant effect of component of apology, F(2.70, 313.36) = 47.93, p < .001. 
Pairwise comparisons replicated earlier results, showing that compensating 
component was more effective than cognitive component in increasing the 
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willingness to reconcile with the transgressor, for details please refer to Table 8. In 
addition, there was no significant interaction between facial dominance and 
component of apology F(3, 348) = .80, p = .50, which suggests no moderating effect 
of facial dominance on the relationship between component of apology and 
willingness to reconcile with the transgressor. This result is inconsistent with our 
hypothesis H4a. 
Our further analysis tested our assumption that perceived sincerity of the 
apology was the underlying mechanism that mediates the difference between 
compensating and cognitive component. We also tested alternative theoretical 
approach to perceived sincerity, where it is assumed to be a moderator (Tomlinson et 
al., 2004). To test for mediation and moderation, we used techniques suggested by 
Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001). According to these techniques, the first step is 
to calculate difference score of dependent variable, the transgressor's trustworthiness. 
In the second step, difference score of the predictor (proposed mediator and/or 
moderator) is calculated, perceived sincerity in our case. Then, sum score of the 
predictor is calculated and centered. At last, the difference score in the dependent 
variable is regressed on the difference score and centered sum score of the predictor. 
A significant regression coefficient of difference score predictor indicates mediation 
and significant regression coefficient of centered sum score indicates moderation. 
We first tested whether the difference between cognitive and compensating 
component in transgressor's trustworthiness can be explained by perceived sincerity 
of the components. Our analysis found significant regression coefficient of difference 
score (β = .77, p < .001) with significant regression coefficient of intercept (β = .55, p 
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< .05), which suggests partial mediation. The sum score was not significant (β = .09, 
p = .08) which indicates that perceived sincerity was not a moderator. These results 
were replicated when willingness to reconcile was used as a dependent variable, the 
only difference being that our analysis indicated full mediation. Specifically, we 
found significant regression coefficient of difference score (β = .49, p < .001), 
regression coefficient of intercept was not significant (β = .23, p = .09, n.s.), and 
regression coefficient of sum score was not significant (β = .04, p = .25). We also 
tested whether perceived sincerity is the underlying mechanism of the interaction 
between component of apology and facial dominances. Our analysis found significant 
regression coefficient of difference score (β = .909, p < .001) and intercept (β = -
2.019, p < .001), which means that perceived sincerity is a significant partial mediator 
of the difference in the effect of compensating component on transgressor's 
trustworthiness caused by facial dominance of the transgressor. The sum score was 
not significant (β = -.052, p = .483) which indicates that perceived sincerity was not a 
moderator. These findings support the hypothesis H4b, suggesting that perceived 
sincerity of apology is the underlying mechanism of the observed effect. 
 
Exploratory Analysis 
While the most of hypotheses regarding the interaction effect of types of 
apologies and facial dominance were not supported, there was a robust main effect of 
types of apologies. To understand the nature of the main effect and its underlying 
mechanism, we conducted exploratory analysis that tested whether the main effect of 
components of apology on transgressor's trustworthiness can be explained by 
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perceived sincerity. We also tested alternative theoretical approach to perceived 
sincerity, where it is assumed to be a moderator (Tomlinson et al., 2004). To test for 
mediation and moderation, we again used techniques suggested by Judd, Kenny, and 
McClelland (2001).  As you can see on Table 9, perceived sincerity was a significant 
moderator only in the case of the difference between compensating and empathy 
component in transgressor's trustworthiness, none of the other differences were 
moderated by perceived sincerity. However, perceived sincerity was a significant 
mediator of all the differences in transgressor's trustworthiness caused by the different 
components of apology. Furthermore, lack of significance of the regression 
coefficient of the intercept indicates full mediation  (Judd et al., 2001). Here, our 
analysis showed that perceived sincerity of the apology fully mediated the difference 
between all components in their effect on transgressor's trustworthiness, except in the 
case of compensating vs empowering component.  
 Next, we conducted the same set of analyses with the willingness to reconcile 
as the dependent variable. In other words, we tested whether the main effect of 
components of apology on the willingness to reconcile can be explained by perceived 
sincerity. We again used Judd, Kenny, and McClelland's (2001) techniques. As you 
can see on Table 10, perceived sincerity was not a significant moderator of any of the 
differences between components in the willingness to reconcile with the transgressor. 
However, perceived sincerity was a significant mediator of all the differences in 
willingness to reconcile with the transgressor caused by the different components of 
apology. Furthermore, our analysis showed that perceived sincerity of the apology 
fully mediated the difference between all components in their effect on transgressor's 
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impression, except in the case of compensating vs empowering component and 
cognitive vs compensating component. Overall, these results support the assumption 
that perceived sincerity is the underlying mechanism of the effectiveness of different 
components of apology. 
 
Discussion 
 Our analysis did not show any main effect of facial dominance of the 
transgressor on the effectiveness of apology in both, perceived trustworthiness of the 
offender and victim's willingness to reconcile with the offender. This is surprising 
because research has repeatedly indicated that people with highly dominant faces are 
perceived as less trustworthy, more likely to engage in antisocial behavior (Perrett et 
al., 1998), less likely to experience remorse, and less likely to apologize (Hareli et al., 
2011). From this perspective, our study did not manage to replicate these findings. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that in the current design, the effect of some of these 
impressions cancel each other out. For example, individuals with highly dominant 
faces are perceived as less trustworthy, which renders their apologies less effective. 
However, the fact that they are also perceived as less likely to apologize means that 
their apologies are unexpected. Long and Brecke (2003) identified unexpectedness as 
one of the markers of a reliable signal of intention to restore and adhere to trusting 
relationship. Put together, these two mechanisms could lead to the lack of main effect 
of facial dominance on the effectiveness of apology, even though it does influence the 
victim's judgment. 
 This line of thinking is somewhat supported by the fact that facial dominance 
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of the transgressor proved to be a significant moderator of the effect of apology 
components on perceived trustworthiness of the transgressor. Particularly 
compensating component seems to be responsible for this effect, where it is more 
effective when used by a transgressor with highly dominant face as opposed to 
transgressor with low dominant face. Past research already showed that offers of 
compensation are relatively more effective than other components of apology (e.g., 
Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Schlenker & Darby, 1981). This can be explained by signaling 
theory because the amount of compensation can be used as a measure of honest 
intention and commitment to the relationship. However, what makes it more effective 
for people with dominant faces? The key could be the earlier-mentioned 
unexpectedness. If people with dominant faces are perceived as more likely to cheat 
(Perrett et al., 1998), then the fact that they spontaneously used the type of apology, 
whose honestly can be simply tested (by accepting the compensation) and which 
therefore lacks any ambiguity that would allow cheating and manipulation of the 
victim, means an extra certainty that they are committed to the relationship. This way, 
the unexpectedness of them apologizing at all compensates for the general lower 
trustworthiness, which explains our failure to find main effect of facial dominance, 
and the additional unexpectedness of the use of this particular type of apology is 
responsible for the advantage over low facial dominance transgressors. Other factors 
identified by Long and Brecke (2003), such as costliness and vulnerability, probably 
did not play such an important role. This can be documented by the fact that we did 
not see the same relationship in the case of empowering component. Empowering 
component should be more costly for highly dominant individuals, because they 
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should be more concerned about the loss of social power. They should also be less 
comfortable with the loss of social power because it renders them vulnerable as 
compared to less dominant individuals. Yet, we did not observe any moderating effect 
of facial dominance in the case of empowering component. In any case, our finding 
that sincerity mediates this moderating effect of facial dominance on the effectiveness 
of compensating component indicates that we should search for answers within 
signaling theory framework. 
 Indeed, Study 1 provided quite robust support for the use of signaling theory 
within the apology and trust restoration field, as all the observed differences in the 
effectiveness of different components of apology were mediated by the perceived 
sincerity of the apology. From this perspective, perceived sincerity of apology can be 
defined as the degree to which participants think that the apology is a reliable signal 
of the transgressor's intentions, which is the underlying mechanism of signaling 
theory framework (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984).  
Study 1 has some clear limitations. First, it is a scenario study, which means 
that participants only provide judgment about how they think they would behave, 
which, however, does not mean that their believe would translate into actual behavior. 
We will address this concern in Study 2. Further, the policy-capturing design means 
that participants make multiple consecutive judgments on similar task. This means 
that they do not evaluate each component of apology as a stand-alone event, but 
rather they compare them to each other, which could lead to contrast effect. This way, 
participants would exaggerate the differences between the presented components. An 
opposite effect could occur in the case of facial dominance comparison. Some 
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participants reported that they thought that the faces should have an effect on their 
judgment so they were trying to control for it, because they do not agree with judging 
people by their face. This would inevitably lead to assimilation effect in their 
judgment. We will address these two issues in Study 2 by using between-subject 
design. At last, Study 1 focuses on the comparison between different components of 
apology and therefore it lacks no apology condition. Study 2 will include no apology 
condition so we can gain better insight into the magnitude of the observed effects. 
Chapter 12: Study 2 
 The purpose of this study was to replicate the findings from study 2 in 
between subject design. Further, this study manipulated transgression and consequent 
trust restoration attempt in more realistic setting with real behavioral outcome. At last, 
it included no apology condition as a point of comparison for the different 
components of apology. 
The experimental design was based on the repeated Prisoners Dilemma Game 
used by Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and Murnighan (2002). Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
(PDG) has long been used to model situations where conflict of interests might arise 
(Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Weber, Kopelman & Messick, 2004) and where optimal 
outcomes depend on the mutual trust of the involved parties (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
In PDG, each of two players is faced with two choices: cooperative and competitive. 
If both players choose cooperative choice, then they achieve best joint outcome; the 
best individual outcome is achieved when the target person plays competitive choice 
to the opponent's cooperation. This makes every cooperative choice prone to 
exploitation, because situation when the target person chooses the cooperative option 
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to opponent's competitive choice leads to lowest individual outcome for the target 
player. The worst joint outcomes are a product of a situation where both parties 
choose the competitive option. Therefore, in an iterated design it is advantageous to 
build up trusting relationship between the players, but when the other party is not 
trustworthy, it is safer to compete as prevention against exploitation. In other words, 
every exploitative attempt leads to the loss of trust, but yet in long term it is 
advantageous to restore this trust (Rousseau et al., 1998). This setting is very similar 
to the situations of transgression, where the offender tries to safe the cooperative 
relationship by means of apology (Kim, Dirks & Cooper, 2009). For these reasons, 
the iterated PDG presents a good model situation for testing our hypotheses about the 
effectiveness of apology. 
 Bottom and his colleagues (2002) took advantage of these properties in their 
study of the effectiveness of the offer of compensation. They used an algorithm 
impersonating one of the players in iterated PDG, and in a number of cooperative 
rounds of the game they established a trusting relationship. Their interface allowed 
the exchange of short messages. After these initial rounds, the algorithm competed 
(transgression) and then used explanation and different offers of compensation to 
reestablish the cooperative relationship. We modified Bottom and his colleagues' 
(2002) paradigm to test our hypotheses. First, the fake player (computer program) 
was accompanied with a profile picture, which manipulated the facial dominance. 
Second, the short messages were used to manipulate the different components of 
apology. 
 Participants. 228 participants were recruited from Singapore Management 
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University undergraduates in exchange for small payment (SGD 6 + their earnings, 
on average total of SGD 13.3, SD = .22). After removal of the participants that 
showed suspicion about the identity of the other player (whether it was a real person), 
we were left with 190 participants, 79 males and 111 females, of average age of 21.9 
(SD = 1.84). 86.8 % described themselves as Chinese, 2.6% as Malay, 7.4 % as 
Indian, and 3.2% as other. 
 Procedure. The study started with cooperation priming where during the 
instructions to the PDG, the advantages of cooperation were emphasized (Bottom, 
Gibson, Daniels & Murnighan, 2002). This priming served as a manipulation to 
establish trusting and cooperative relationship. Consequently, participants were 
presented with the PDG 2x2 payoff matrix, refer to Figure 3. If Player A chooses 
"Cooperate" option and Player B also "Cooperate", then the payoff was SGD 0.5 for 
each player. Combination "Compete" and "Compete" yielded SGD 0.4 for each 
player. Finally, if Player A played "Cooperate" and Player B played "Compete", then 
Player A earned SGD 0.3 and Player B's yield is SGD 0.6. They were also told that 
the number of rounds will be determined by a random number generator, and that the 
minimum number of rounds will be at least 10 and maximum 40. The average length 
of the game was presented as 15 - 25 rounds. All these instructions were designed to 
encourage cooperative choices in the early rounds of the game (Bottom, Gibson, 
Daniels & Murnighan, 2002). 
 Participants were randomly assigned to high/low facial dominance times type 
of apology condition, which constitutes 2 (high vs. low facial dominance) x 4 
components of apology between subject design. Participants were told that they were 
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playing with other participants, when in fact all of them were playing against a preset 
computer program. In other words, Player 2 was always a computer program, and 
participants were always assigned to the role of Player 1. 
 The study was designed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), which is a program 
designed for conducting economic game experiments. Participants were told that the 
current study investigates different conditions, such as whether the players can see 
each other, and that in their condition, they will be able to see the other player, while 
the other player will not be able to see them. It was also mentioned that the other 
player was from a different university, which served as an explanation for why the 
person on the picture was not present in the same room as the participant. Participants 
were also introduced to the possibility to communicate through short messages with 
the other player, one message per round. 
 Then the game began. In the first 6 rounds the algorithm played cooperatively, 
accompanied with encouraging messages, such as “keep it up!”, refer to Table 11 for 
exact message schedule. After this cooperative phase, the algorithm started to play 
competitively for 5 rounds, with messages “I thought you'd pick compete now” and “I 
felt I had to protect myself” (Bottom, Gibson, Daniels & Murnighan, 2002). At the 
end of this phase the program used the apology manipulation, which was followed by 
two cooperative rounds. Afterward, the program mirrored the participant's choices. 
After 15th round, the last round was announced. After playing the last round, 
participants were presented with the same scales as in Study 1 to measure severity 
and intentionality of the transgression, sincerity of the apology, and trustworthiness of 
the offender; for items please refer to Appendix F. In addition to these measures from 
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Study 1, participants filled in a set of the following individual difference measures: 
16-item Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 
1998), 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999), Levels of Self-concept 
scale (Selenta & Lord, 2005), Implicit Theory of Morality scale (Chiu et al., 1997), 
and Social Values Orientations scale (Van Lange, 1999). In the end, participants were 
debriefed and paid. 
 Facial stimuli. During the game, participants were presented with the picture 
of Player 2. As in Study 1, this was a randomly assigned picture of a face either high 
or low on facial dominance features. These faces were from the picture set created in 
Pilot study 1. 
 Apology manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions: no apology and 3 proposed components of apology. Cognitive component 
was manipulated as “I'm sorry, it's my fault we are losing points now...could we both 
cooperate again?”; empathy as “I'm sorry for this, I see how this made you 
feel...could we both cooperate again?”; and compensating as “I'm sorry for this, is 
there anything I can do so we could both cooperate again?” (based on Bottom, 
Gibson, Daniels & Murnighan, 2002). In no apology condition, Player 2 just switched 
to cooperative choices. 
 
Results. 
 First, we excluded people that competed more than 3 times in the initial 6 
rounds, because in their case the cooperation prime did not work. Moreover, these 
participants clearly did not develop a trusting relationship with Player 2, which 
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invalidates later transgression manipulation. This left us with 174 participants, 73 
males and 101 females, of average age of 21.95 (SD = 1.87). Afterwards, relevant 
dependent variables were calculated. In particular, we used the number of times 
participant chose "Compete" during the rounds after the apology manipulation as a 
behavioral measure of trust restoration. Further, perceived severity of transgressions 
scale showed reliability α = .846, perceived intentionality of the transgression α = 
.838, sincerity of the response α = .924, and perceived trustworthiness α = .884. 
 The inspection of the correlation table showed that perceived severity of the 
transgression was positively related to the number of competitive moves after 
apology (r = .30, p < .01), and negatively related to trustworthiness of the offender (r 
= -.33, p < .01), refer to Table 12. Perceived intentionality of the transgression 
showed only negative relationship with the perceived trustworthiness of the 
transgressor (r = -.30, p < .01), but was unrelated to number of competitive choices (r 
= .14, p = .07, n.s.). Further, perceived sincerity of apology showed negative 
relationship with number of competitive choices (r = -.39, p < .01) and positive 
relationship with perceived trustworthiness of the transgressor(r = .58, p < .01). 
 We also uncovered some interesting patterns in individual differences. 
Notably, prosocial orientation was negatively related to the number of competitions 
after apology (r = -.38, p < .01), and positively related to the perceived 
trustworthiness of the transgressor (r = .29, p < .01). Exactly opposite pattern was 
observed for individualistic orientation (rcompetitions = .42, p < .01; rtrustworthiness = -.35, p 
< .01), while competitive orientation was unrelated to these outcomes (rcompetitions = 
.03, p = .68, n.s.; rtrustworthiness = -.02, p = .80, n.s.). Relational and collectivistic self-
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concept were both negatively related to the number of competitions after apology(r = 
-.20, p < .01; r = -.16, p < .05), and positively related to the perceived trustworthiness 
of the transgressor (r = .22, p < .01; r = .18, p < .05). No sex differences in the 
number of competitive choices (r = .14, p = .08, n.s.) or perceived trustworthiness (r 
= -.10, p = .18, n.s.) were observed, but contrary to previous findings (Schumann & 
Ross, 2010), males saw transgressions as more intentional (r = .24, p < .01) and 
severe (r = .18, p < .05). 
 
Hypotheses testing 
H1a: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be more effective as compared to 
people with low dominant faces. 
H1b: Apologies of people with dominant faces will be less effective as compared to 
people with low dominant faces. 
 
 To test this hypothesis we conducted series of independent samples t-tests. 
First, we used number of competitive decisions after transgressor's apology as a 
dependent variable. Results showed that on average, there was no significant 
difference between transgressors with highly dominant faces (M = 2.03, SD = 1.89) as 
compared to transgressors with low dominant faces (M = 1.86, SD = 1.89) in the 
number of competitive moves they received after they apologized for their 
transgression, t(172)= .60, p = .55. Replicating these results, on average there was no 
difference between the perceived trustworthiness of transgressors with highly 
dominant faces (M = 10.76, SD = 4.2) as compared to transgressors with low 
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dominant faces (M = 11.60, SD = 4.3), t(172)= -1.3, p = .20. These results are 
incongruent with both of the proposed hypotheses.  
 
H2a: Empathy components of apology will be more effective then cognitive 
components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H2b: Empathy components of apology will be less effective than cognitive 
components in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H2c: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and empathy 
component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the apology. 
 
To test these hypotheses we first conducted a set of 2 (high vs. low dominant 
face of transgressor) x 4 (component of apology manipulation) factorial ANOVAs 
with number of competitive decisions after apology and transgressor's trustworthiness 
as dependent variables. First, we used the number of competitive decisions after 
apology as dependent variable. Confirming our earlier results, our analysis did not 
find any main effect of facial dominance on the number of competitive decisions after 
apology, F(1,166) = .57, p = .67. The main effect of the component of apology was 
significant, F(3,166) = 35.00, p < .001. However, the most important aspect of the 
analysis for our hypothesis is the interaction between apology component and facial 
dominance. Our analysis showed that there was no significant interaction effect of 
facial dominance and apology component on the number of competitive moves after 
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transgressor's apology, F(3,166) = 1.04, p = .80. This result is incongruent with our 
hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
Second, we conducted the same analysis with perceived trustworthiness of the 
transgressor as dependent variable. This analysis replicated our earlier result, showing 
no significant main effect of facial dominance, F(1,166) = 1.52, p = .22, significant 
main effect of apology component, F(3,166) = 6.50, p < .001, and no significant 
effect of interaction effect of facial dominance and apology component on 
transgressor's trustworthiness, F(3,166) = .95, p = .42. Based on these results, we 
have to reject hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
As was described above, our analysis revealed significant main effect of 
component of apology on both, the number of competitive decisions after apology 
and perceived trustworthiness of the transgressor. However, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that there was a significant difference in apology conditions between no 
apology and the three used components of apology, but there was not any significant 
difference between the components, refer to Table 13 and Table 14, and to Figure 4 
Figure 5. In other words, the observed main effect of component of apology was 
caused by the difference between no apology and an apology present. Planned 
contrast revealed that compared to no apology, apology conditions on average 
decreased the number of competitive decisions by 1.78, t(172) = 5.97, p < .001. 
However, once apology was present, the participants did not seem to differentiate 
between different components. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to test hypothesis H2c, because there is no 
significant difference to be explained by sincerity of apology as a mediator. 
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H4a: Compensating components of apology will be more effective then cognitive 
component in people with dominant faces compared to people with faces low on 
dominance. 
H4b: The observed difference between the effectiveness of cognitive and 
compensating component will be mediated by the victim's perceived sincerity of the 
apology. 
 
Earlier analyses showed no significant interaction effect of facial dominance 
and component of apology on both, number of competitions after apology (F(3,166) 
= 1.04, p = .80, n.s.) and transgressor's trustworthiness (F(3,166) = .95, p = .42, n.s.). 
Based on these results we have to reject H4a. Since H4a was not supported, there is 
also no way to test hypothesis H4b, because there is no significant difference caused 
by facial dominance to be explained by the proposed mediation model. 
 
H4c: Compensation offered by people with dominant faces will be less likely to be 
accepted by the victims, as compared to offenders with less dominant faces. 
H4d: Compensation offered by people with dominant faces will be more likely to be 
accepted by the victims, as compared to offenders with less dominant faces. 
 
To test these hypotheses we first calculated new dependent variable, which 
was the number of competitions in the first two rounds after apology. Two rounds 
after apology were selected because they were the most proximal rounds to the 
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apology. As we can see from Table 11, the Player 2 algorithm was programmed to 
cooperate in these two rounds, which allowed participants to compensate themselves 
by choosing "Compete" and thus obtaining the highest individual payoff. In other 
words, Player 1's competitive choices during these two rounds indicated accepted 
compensation offer. With this dependent variable, we conducted independent sample 
t-test comparing transgressors with high facial dominance and transgressors with low 
facial dominance, all restricted to compensating apology component condition. 
Results showed that on average, there was no significant difference between 
transgressors with highly dominant faces (M = .70, SD = .80) and transgressors with 
low dominant faces (M = .86, SD = .64) in how much participants compensated 
themselves after compensation was offered by the transgressor, t(40)= -.74, p = .47. 
H4c and H4d were not supported. 
 
Discussion 
 Study 2 replicated results from Study 1 in that it did not find any main effect 
of facial dominance, and since it used between-subject design, assimilation effect is 
unlikely to be responsible, because participants saw only one face and therefore they 
could not try to consciously counteract potential differences in judgment based on 
face. One possibility is that our sample size was not large enough to detect this main 
effect. Indeed, we observed a trend in the direction that the apologies of high facial 
dominance transgressors were less effective. However, in that case we would be 
dealing with relatively low effect sizes. 
 More surprisingly, Study 2 did not replicate the main effect of apology 
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component observed in Study 1. Study 1 used scenarios in within-subject design and 
uncovered significant differences between different components of apology, namely 
compensating component was significantly more effective than cognitive component, 
cognitive component was more effective than empowering component, and 
empowering component was more effective then empathy component. Study 2 used 
behavior to manipulate transgression as well as to measure consequent reconciliation 
in between-subject design. However, results showed that participants significantly 
differentiated only between the presence and the absence of an apology, while we did 
not find any evidence that they differentiated between different components. This 
would mean that participants did not differentiate different types of apology, as long 
as the transgressor apologized. 
 This lack of differentiation between different components is even more 
surprising if we consider that it is also inconsistent with some of the previous research 
(e.g. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Scher & Darley, 1997; Schmitt et al., 2004). Here, it is 
important to consider that all these previous studies used scenarios and within-subject 
design, the same way as in our Study 1. This leaves us with two possible 
interpretations. 
First option is that while people do report differences in the effectiveness of 
different components when they imagine themselves in the situations based on 
scenarios, they do not differentiate between these components in real-life situations. It 
is important to note that while many studies showed high levels of consistency 
between scenario studies and real-life situations (e.g., Rahman, 1996), certain 
research topics have been found to produce great inconsistencies between scenarios 
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and real-life situations (e.g., Carlson, 1996). In the case of the effectiveness of 
apology component it is too early to tell. Our Study 2 suggests that there might be 
some differences between our beliefs about how we think we would react when faced 
with certain types of apology components, and how we would actually react in such 
situations. Indeed, De Cremer, Pillutla, and Folmer (2011) in their set of studies 
showed that people make forecasting errors when they imagine that somebody 
apologized to them. More specifically, people tended to overestimate how much an 
apology would repair their relationship with the transgressor when they were 
imagining the situation as compared to when they actually received an apology in 
such situation. It is possible that a similar phenomenon occurs when people imagine 
the effectiveness of different components of apology in a sense that they overestimate 
these differences in the imagined scenario situations. Nevertheless, such conclusion 
would require replication in greater variety of situations so we can be sure that our 
null findings are not a result of some situation-specific confound, which brings us to 
second interpretation. 
 It is possible that the lack of differentiation between different components of 
apology is caused by some specific aspects of the design of Study 2. For example, the 
communication medium could be responsible for the lack of effect. Research has 
already shown that the use of text chat for interaction between participants leads to 
different outcomes as compared to face-to-face communication. More specifically, 
some studies indicate that the use of chat as communication medium makes it harder 
to accomplish and maintain cooperation in social dilemma games as compared to 
face-to-face communication; however, text-chat levels of cooperation are still higher 
71 
 
 
than in no-communication conditions (Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2007). In addition, 
research also showed that the use of text chat leads to slower development of trusting 
relationships in both individuals (Bos, Olson, Gergle, Olson, & Wright, 2002) and 
teams (Wilson, Straus, & McEvily, 2006). At this point, it is unclear what factors are 
responsible for these differences, but literature shows that results obtained from text-
chat studies might not be directly generalizable to face-to-face interaction. 
It is also possible that the impersonal and rather detached nature of chat 
communication caused that contextual factors of the task were relatively weak in their 
influence on participant's behavior as compared to the effect of personalities of the 
participants (e.g., Balliet, Li, & Joireman, 2011).  From our results, particularly social 
value orientations seem to be relatively strong predictors of the measured outcomes, 
where individualistic orientation is more competitive and less trusting, while 
prosocial orientation is more cooperative and trusting. Surprisingly, competitive 
orientation was unrelated to these outcomes. 
 There is also the possibility that the payoff difference between mutual 
cooperation and competition were not large enough. In other words, the stakes might 
have been too low so the cost of paying attention to details such as content of 
apologies outweighed the gain or loss of few cents. This way, the difference between 
the payoff gain from restored cooperation and loss in case the transgressor used the 
apology as an exploitative manipulative strategy did not present enough threat that 
would justify the vigilance to this signal. Consequently, this decrease in vigilance 
would lead to lower differentiation (e.g., Fridlund, 1991; Smith, 1980). 
 Another explanation for the lack of differentiation between apology 
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components might be that the used apologies were relatively long in the context of 
text messaging. Schlenker  and Darby (1981) found that the more severe the 
transgression, the more elaborate apology it takes to achieve reconciliation. Text 
messaging usually uses short messages, and therefore the relatively longer 
formulations of apology could be perceived as elaborate enough to restore the 
relationship. In our case then the effect of elaboration of apology outweighs the effect 
of different components of apology and effectively creates a ceiling effect. As a result 
we did not find any differentiation between the components of apology. 
 We also did not find any significant interaction effects between facial 
dominance of the transgressor and apology component. This is less surprising if we 
consider the lack of significant main effects. Unfortunately, the lack of difference 
between different components of apology did not allow us to explore the role of 
sincerity beyond the fact that it is correlated with higher effectiveness of apology. 
Study 2 has some clear limitations. As already mentioned, the sample size of 
Study 2 is relatively low. We also mentioned that there are concerns whether the use 
of text chat as a communication medium allow generalizability to face-to-face 
interactions. In addition to these limitations, our study used only relatively low 
number of pictures to manipulate facial dominance. Larger number and greater 
variety of pictures would allow us to decrease the probability of any possible 
confounds in the selected pictures. Similarly, our studies used only male pictures, and 
therefore it is unclear whether we would obtain the same results for female faces. At 
last, we used algorithm to manipulate the transgression and consequent apology. 
Future research should explore whether people react the same way when 
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transgressions and apologies occur naturally in real chat interaction. 
 
Chapter 13: General Discussion and Conclusion 
Our studies add to our knowledge about the effects of facial dominance. Past 
research showed that people with high perceived facial dominance are perceived as 
less trustworthy (Perrett et al., 1998), less likely to experience regret, and less likely 
to apologize (Hareli et al., 2011). However, despite of these previous findings both of 
our studies did not reveal any main effect of facial dominance. This means that 
despite these rather negative first impressions of people with high facial dominance, 
their willingness to use apology after the breach of trust leads to equivalent 
trustworthiness and probability of reconciliation as in the case of people with low 
facial dominance. In other words, apology acts as an equalizer between people with 
high and low facial dominance. It is likely that there are some tradeoffs between 
different aspects of the impression of people with high facial dominance involved in 
this lack of main effect. Facial dominance makes them less trustworthy, but the fact 
that they are also perceived as less likely to apologize means that their apologies are 
unexpected. Unexpectedness of a signal is one of the factors that make signals 
reliable within signaling theory framework (Long & Brecke, 2003), and therefore it 
might mitigate the effect of initially lower trustworthiness of people with high facial 
dominance. 
There are also some clear implications for Impression management theory. As 
we have shown earlier, the impressions of people with high facial dominance are 
relatively negative as opposed to individuals with low facial dominance. 
74 
 
 
Nevertheless, the fact that we did not find any main effect of facial dominance means 
that apology is particularly effective tactic of impression management when used by 
people with high facial dominance. This can also be documented by our findings in 
Study 1, where we certain components of apology lead to significantly more positive 
impression of people with high facial dominance.   
 Study 1 also revealed significant main effect of apology. Here, the important 
aspect is that the used scenarios were set in workplace context, as opposed to 
relatively informal contexts of previous studies (e.g., Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Scher & 
Darley, 1997; Schmitt et al., 2004). In our scenarios, offers of compensation were the 
most effective. The second most effective was cognitive component, where 
transgressor admits offense and takes responsibility. The third most effective was 
empowering component, which is essentially request for forgiveness. At last, the least 
effective was empathy component, which expressed interest in the victim's suffering. 
This pattern is quite different from the previous research. For example, Fehr & 
Gelfand (2010) also found offers of compensation to be the most effective, but 
empathy component to be more effective than cognitive component.  This is probably 
caused by the fact that the formal atmosphere of workplace environment makes social 
norms more salient and therefore acknowledgment of transgression and especially the 
act of taking the responsibility is particularly important. 
 Study 2, however, did not find any difference in the effect of different 
components on the transgressor's impression. This would suggest a mismatch 
between the expectations about how different components would improve 
transgressor's impression, and how it actually improves it in real situation. Impression 
75 
 
 
management framework research has until now been relying heavily on scenario 
survey research and therefore this mismatch presents an important consideration for 
the future studies within the research programme in a sense that it should put more 
emphasis on behavioral measures and between subject designs. 
 At last, in both studies, impression of the transgressor was a strong predictor 
of willingness to reconcile and cooperation in both studies which further supports the 
basic thesis of impression management theory: apology leads to improvements in 
impression management which in turn leads to reconciliation. 
 From the Needs theory perspective (Lazare, 2004), the results of study 1 
suggests that working environment seems to accentuate the need to be compensated 
(i.e., compensating component of apology) and the need to be assured that a norm has 
been breached and that the victim is not responsible (i.e., cognitive component of 
apology). The need to regain social power (i.e., empowering component of apology) 
and the need for social inclusion (i.e., empathetic apology) seem to be less salient. 
This could be expected within the formal relationship of colleagues and their 
respective roles in the organization. Study 2 suggests that within the Prisoner's 
Dilemma context, neither of the needs is particularly more salient, although it is 
unclear what needs would be involved within the trust that is based on such a short 
encounter. 
Signaling theory proved to be an effective framework for apology research, 
especially if we consider that in agreement with its basic tenet, perceived sincerity of 
the apology mediated the main effect of apology component, as well as the interaction 
between apology component and facial dominance observed in Study 1. The clear 
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best performance of compensating component and the relatively low performance of 
empathy component suggests that there is a strong preference for more testable 
apologies in workplace conditions. Offer of compensation can be easily tested simply 
by accepting the offer. In addition, people are probably more vigilant to mixed 
motives of the transgressor, where he or she might attempt to exploit the victim in the 
future. This in turn makes victims more skeptical about empathy components of 
apology, because it is hard to test the sincerity of concerns about victim's feelings. 
Signaling theory is also the only framework that can explain why despite of 
their negative initial impression, people with high facial dominance do as well as 
people with low dominance when apology is used to improve impression and restore 
trust, and even better when compensating component is used. Apology coming from 
people with high facial dominance is unexpected, and unexpectedness is one of the 
factors that increase reliability of a signal (Long & Brecke, 2003). This increased 
reliability then counteracts the effect of initially lower trustworthiness of people with 
high facial dominance. And since offer of compensation provides the lowest 
opportunity for manipulation, it is even more unexpected that a person who is initially 
less trustworthy (i.e., people with high facial dominance) would use this strategy in 
particular. This explains why compensating component is more effective in people 
with high dominance, when it comes to creating trustworthy impression. Ultimately, 
future research should investigate whether unexpectedness really is the major factor 
that is responsible for the relatively high perceived sincerity of apologies coming 
from a person with high facial dominance. 
 Another important aspect with potentially important implications is that while 
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we did find differences in effectiveness in scenario study, we did not manage to 
replicate these findings in an experiment where participants were exposed to real 
transgression after which transgressor apologized and it was up to the participant 
whether the trust was restored. This suggests that there might be a difference between 
our beliefs about how we would react to particular types of apology, and how we 
would react if we actually were in the situation. There already exists a study which 
indicates that this might be the case. De Cremer with colleagues (2011) found that 
people overestimate the effectiveness apology when imagine that someone apologized 
to them, as compared to the situation where someone actually apologizes. Our Studies 
1 and 2 unfortunately cannot be compared directly, because they differ in their 
contextual setting. Future research should remedy that by using the same setting in 
the scenario and in the actual experimental study so we can directly compare the 
magnitude of the effectiveness of different components of apology. 
 Our findings have clear practical implications. First, offers of compensation 
and acknowledgment of transgression with taking a responsibility for it (cognitive 
component) seem to be more effective in workplace context. This is probably caused 
by more formal norms for what constitutes transgression and how to restore trust in 
professional relationships (R. Fehr & Gelfand, 2010). Requests for forgiveness 
(empowering component) and expressions of empathy are perceived as less sincere 
and consequently lead to lower perceived trustworthiness of the offender and lower 
willingness to reconcile with the transgressor.  
Second, for people with high facial dominance, apology might be a very 
powerful tool for their management of social interactions. People with high facial 
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dominance have to deal with the consequences of some of the negative impressions 
that high facial dominance is associated with, such as lower trustworthiness (Perrett et 
al., 1998). This might put them into disadvantage as compared to people with low 
facial dominance. Apology may function as an equalizer in terms of both, impression 
and trust repair. This is especially relevant for managers and people in leadership 
positions. Research has shown that people with high facial dominance are more 
motivated to acquire higher social status (Muller & Mazur, 1997). Indeed, there is an 
evidence that in business, people in leadership positions are more likely to be higher 
in facial dominance (Alrajih & Ward, 2013). This puts them into position that makes 
them more likely to have to strive to restore trust and repair relationships. Such 
situations might occur within the group they are in charge of. Research has shown 
that positive and cooperative relationships in the workplace increase individual and 
collective productivity (De Dreu, 2008), which makes the issue of forgiveness and 
trust restoration in the workplace one of the important managerial concerns (Aquino 
et al., 2003). Clearly, the use of apology and especially of the compensating 
component can help to remedy potential lack of trust. 
Leaders' role is to represent the group in negotiation with other groups and 
individuals, which makes them more likely to be in a situation when they have to 
apologize on behalf of a group. Teams tend to show competitive tendencies (e.g., 
Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003), while high level of cooperation 
between teams is essential for organizations’ success (De Dreu & Boles, 1998). This 
means that team leaders have to be able to effectively restore the trust between teams 
and apology might be one of the main means to achieve this goal. 
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Table 2 
One-Sample T-test of Perceived Presence of Transgression Categories in Scenarios 
 
M SD t df p Mean 
Difference 
Scenario 1 - goal obstruction 12.14 2.10 17.89 142 .000 3.14 
Scenario 2 - goal obstruction 11.78 2.17 15.32 142 .000 2.78 
Scenario 1 - norm violation 11.81 2.29 14.69 142 .000 2.81 
Scenario 2 - norm violation 12.30 2.13 18.50 142 .000 3.30 
Scenario 1 - power derogation 10.96 2.39 9.82 142 .000 1.96 
Scenario 2 - power derogation 10.78 2.46 8.67 142 .000 1.78 
Note. N = 143; test value of all scores = 9, which is a score that would be reached if 
respondents were not sure whether the particular category of transgression was present in 
the described scenario. All scores above 9 indicate that the category of transgression is 
perceived as present in the scenario. 
 
  
94 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Exploratory Factor Analysis for Apology Component Items 
Items Factor 
In general, a good apology should include... Cognitive Empathy Compensation Empowering 
1. an offer to compensate me for what 
happened 
.161 .035 .921 -.029 
2. an offer to help me recover my damages .009 -.024 .957 -.115 
3. an offer to do something specific to make up 
for what happened .096 -.023 .680 .211 
4. a suggestion that he/she reimburse me in 
some way .288 .073 .744 .264 
5. an expression of great concern for my 
suffering 
-.123 .714 .147 -.013 
6. a show of empathy toward me .102 .896 .053 .035 
7. an indication that he/she truly cares about 
how I feel -.006 .703 -.246 .083 
8. an expression of tenderness toward me -.052 .799 .062 .037 
9. true sympathy for me .117 .760 -.018 .050 
10. a show of concern for breaking an 
important social norm .716 .254 -.021 -.055 
11. an acknowledgment that he/she didn’t live 
up to group standards .797 -.048 .252 -.031 
12. an acknowledgment that he/she violated an 
important group rule .889 -.035 .063 .184 
13. an admission that he/she did not live up to 
the standards of the group .738 -.044 .142 .078 
14. a verbal recognition that he/she failed to act 
as a good group member .822 -.072 .100 .224 
15. an expression of vulnerability in front of 
me 
.210 .049 .075 .684 
16. humble and submissive formulations .030 -.094 .006 .720 
17. self-humiliating and self-implicating 
expressions related to the incident .143 .017 .200 .668 
18. and expressions of humility in front of me .011 .120 -.012 .711 
19. a denouncement of the transgressing deed -.032 .086 .011 .753 
Eigenvalue 3.387 3.138 3.013 2.739 
% of Variance 17.826 16.514 15.859 14.415 
Note. Boldface values indicate which factors the items load on. Procedure was maximum likelihood 
estimation with varimax rotation. 
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Table 4 
Statement Validation - Pairwise Comparisons of Target and Comparison Scores 
Target Score Comparison Score Mean Difference Std. Error p 
Empowering 
Cognitive 0.55 .153 .001 
Compensating 1.253 .141 .000 
Empathy 0.746 .130 .000 
Compensating 
Empowering 0.85 .129 .000 
Cognitive 1.081 .154 .000 
Empathy 0.604 .113 .000 
Cognitive 
Empowering 0.369 .151 .018 
Compensating 1.381 .158 .000 
Empathy 0.988 .164 .000 
Empathy 
Empowering 0.819 .139 .000 
Cognitive 0.854 .127 .000 
Compensating 1.132 .132 .000 
Note. Target Score = score relevant for the particular manipulation statement; Mean 
Difference = Target score - Comparison score, positive Mean Difference means that Target 
score was higher than Comparison score; all comparisons are based on estimated marginal 
means, mean differences are significant at the .05 level. 
 
  
96 
 
 
Table 5 - part 1 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1         
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Gender  - 
     
2. Age -.583** - 
    
3. LD Severity -.215* .161 (.83) 
   
4. LD Intent -.064 .042 .271** (.98) 
  
5. LD Cog. - Sinc. -.034 .018 -.024 -.262** (.98) 
 
6. LD Cog. - Trustw. -.108 .068 -.168 -.299** .667** (.94) 
7. LD Cog. - Reconc. -.002 -.077 -.162 -.442** .744** .743** 
8. LD Comp. - Sinc. -.099 .193* .165 -.230* .611** .451** 
9. LD Comp. - Trustw. -.095 .056 -.074 -.311** .475** .733** 
10. LD Comp. - 
Reconc. 
.007 -.007 .034 -.355** .502** .554** 
11. LD Empow. - Sinc. .087 -.063 -.006 -.370** .436** .441** 
12. LD Empow. - 
Trustw. 
-.020 .048 -.125 -.357** .380** .705** 
13. LD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
.056 -.093 -.057 -.403** .418** .484** 
14. LD Empat. - Sinc. -.132 .035 -.087 -.206* .498** .412** 
15. LD Empat. - 
Trustw. 
-.054 -.065 -.209* -.375** .404** .685** 
16. LD Empat. - 
Reconc. 
-.046 -.108 -.147 -.355** .438** .494** 
17. HD Severity -.139 .199* .485** .134 .108 -.032 
18. HD Intent .062 .142 -.029 .180 -.052 -.114 
19. HD Cog. - Sinc. -.029 .054 .035 -.129 .490** .367** 
20. HD Cog. - Trustw. -.153 .092 .011 -.155 .357** .642** 
21. HD Cog. - Reconc. -.076 .016 .091 -.093 .311** .342** 
22. HD Comp. - Sinc. -.134 .141 .232* .122 .290** .221* 
23. HD Comp. - 
Trustw. 
-.203* .161 .157 .088 .324** .507** 
24. HD Comp. - 
Reconc. 
-.197* .167 .284** .092 .299** .231* 
25. HD Empow. - Sinc. -.018 .011 .084 -.073 .242** .248** 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; 
Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 2 of 
8 
      Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1         
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
26. HD Empow. - 
Trustw. 
-.082 .021 .018 -.207* .201* .494** 
27. HD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
-.065 .082 .152 -.098 .171 .194* 
28. HD Empat. - Sinc. -.115 -.009 .014 -.033 .224* .300** 
29. HD Empat. - Trustw. -.056 -.094 -.088 -.191* .247** .542** 
30. HD Empat. - 
Reconc. 
-.031 -.098 -.081 -.117 .158 .273** 
31. B5 Agreeabl .201* -.221* .033 -.123 .023 .061 
32. B5 Conscien -.092 .127 .198* .039 -.025 .005 
33. B5 Extravers -.191* .152 .121 .006 .228* .192* 
34. B5 Neurot .406** -.205* .004 .084 -.067 -.111 
35. B5 Openness -.193* .173 .082 -.104 .181 .165 
36. Self-Rep Dominance -.302** .387** .137 .123 .091 .068 
37. Indiv. Self-Concept -.223* .233* .188* .146 -.009 -.090 
38. Relat. Self-Concept .095 -.163 .144 -.146 .042 .003 
39. Collec. Self-Concept .087 -.083 .252** .043 .062 .002 
40. Entity Th. of Char. -.017 .050 .103 .007 -.153 -.200* 
41. Entity Th. of Mor. .006 .083 .181 .153 -.197* -.323** 
42. Horiz. Individualism -.060 .147 .007 .088 -.054 -.159 
43. Vert. Individualism -.189* .169 .156 .280** .064 -.031 
44. Horiz. Collectivism .094 -.111 .109 -.097 .200* .048 
45. Vert. Collectivism .159 -.259** .141 -.020 .154 -.065 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient 
alphas in parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 3 of 8 
      Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1     
  7 8 9 10 11 12 
7. LD Cog. - Reconc. (.92) 
     
8. LD Comp. - Sinc. .500** (.95) 
    
9. LD Comp. - Trustw. .582** .622** (.94) 
   
10. LD Comp. - Reconc. .660** .705** .722** (.94) 
  
11. LD Empow. - Sinc. .548** .423** .483** .545** (.97) 
 
12. LD Empow. - Trustw. .542** .434** .752** .575** .658** (.95) 
13. LD Empow. - Reconc. .638** .440** .561** .650** .817** .746** 
14. LD Empat. - Sinc. .419** .300** .391** .352** .313** .369** 
15. LD Empat. - Trustw. .522** .289** .674** .442** .398** .710** 
16. LD Empat. - Reconc. .652** .273** .508** .560** .430** .459** 
17. HD Severity -.016 .188* .000 .103 .030 -.037 
18. HD Intent -.166 -.133 -.167 -.201* -.116 -.066 
19. HD Cog. - Sinc. .457** .338** .242** .375** .377** .192* 
20. HD Cog. - Trustw. .445** .330** .542** .450** .334** .525** 
21. HD Cog. - Reconc. .440** .247** .310** .410** .358** .258** 
22. HD Comp. - Sinc. .192* .423** .193* .298** .190* .089 
23. HD Comp. - Trustw. .302** .467** .509** .379** .252** .420** 
24. HD Comp. - Reconc. .289** .426** .259** .396** .244** .152 
25. HD Empow. - Sinc. .320** .276** .291** .283** .500** .386** 
26. HD Empow. - Trustw. .327** .302** .569** .386** .431** .649** 
27. HD Empow. - Reconc. .267** .248** .310** .261** .385** .351** 
28. HD Empat. - Sinc. .304** .073 .209* .222* .273** .279** 
29. HD Empat. - Trustw. .423** .214* .501** .357** .364** .592** 
30. HD Empat. - Reconc. .330** .055 .229* .264** .290** .328** 
31. B5 Agreeabl .037 .070 .162 .091 .224* .156 
32. B5 Conscien -.089 .075 -.012 -.060 -.049 .042 
33. B5 Extravers .132 .295** .170 .036 .214* .191* 
34. B5 Neurot -.039 -.071 -.135 .048 -.130 -.138 
35. B5 Openness .242** .036 .141 .018 .116 .120 
36. Self-Rep Dominance .062 .154 .049 -.019 -.051 .067 
37. Indiv. Self-Concept -.098 .054 -.144 -.065 .044 -.039 
38. Relat. Self-Concept .105 -.012 .072 .076 -.003 .019 
39. Collec. Self-Concept .031 .098 .007 -.023 .100 .119 
40. Entity Th. of Char. -.173 .001 -.125 -.098 -.024 -.163 
41. Entity Th. of Mor. -.232* -.026 -.254** -.183* -.025 -.207* 
42. Horiz. Individualism -.123 -.022 -.052 -.125 -.191* -.150 
43. Vert. Individualism -.052 .072 -.135 -.069 -.044 -.065 
44. Horiz. Collectivism .100 .155 .028 -.036 .140 .073 
45. Vert. Collectivism .014 .123 -.018 .070 .103 .057 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 4 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1         
  13 14 15 16 17 18 
13. LD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
(.93) 
     
14. LD Empat. - Sinc. .351** (.98) 
    
15. LD Empat. - Trustw. .505** .623** (.94) 
   
16. LD Empat. - Reconc. .591** .729** .685** (.88) 
  
17. HD Severity -.018 .035 -.126 -.036 (.88) 
 
18. HD Intent -.139 -.163 -.110 -.250** .236* (.92) 
19. HD Cog. - Sinc. .322** .322** .231* .355** -.108 -.345** 
20. HD Cog. - Trustw. .378** .239** .468** .330** -.194* -.321** 
21. HD Cog. - Reconc. .420** .162 .254** .409** -.141 -.347** 
22. HD Comp. - Sinc. .184* .087 .039 .062 -.005 -.292** 
23. HD Comp. - Trustw. .321** .155 .266** .153 -.086 -.269** 
24. HD Comp. - Reconc. .289** .125 .081 .166 -.013 -.365** 
25. HD Empow. - Sinc. .516** .185* .210* .269** -.093 -.354** 
26. HD Empow. - 
Trustw. 
.528** .212* .518** .317** -.156 -.316** 
27. HD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
.487** .163 .291** .298** -.124 -.427** 
28. HD Empat. - Sinc. .366** .564** .484** .603** -.057 -.324** 
29. HD Empat. - Trustw. .511** .445** .665** .558** -.212* -.325** 
30. HD Empat. - Reconc. .436** .502** .468** .597** -.176 -.358** 
31. B5 Agreeabl .174 .004 .128 .084 -.008 -.031 
32. B5 Conscien -.056 .036 -.003 -.042 .087 .046 
33. B5 Extravers .187* -.021 .043 -.006 .124 .017 
34. B5 Neurot -.076 -.176 -.189* -.082 .048 .116 
35. B5 Openness .158 .011 .090 .196* .115 -.165 
36. Self-Rep Dominance -.005 .030 -.089 -.023 .161 .162 
37. Indiv. Self-Concept -.007 -.129 -.175 -.129 .153 .204* 
38. Relat. Self-Concept .001 -.049 .090 .101 .105 .002 
39. Collec. Self-Concept .113 -.075 .001 -.051 .094 .043 
40. Entity Th. of Char. -.157 -.033 -.251** -.202* .124 .143 
41. Entity Th. of Mor. -.128 -.109 -.348** -.247** .043 .174 
42. Horiz. Individualism -.166 -.131 -.193* -.159 .055 .175 
43. Vert. Individualism -.034 -.031 -.119 -.108 .147 .298** 
44. Horiz. Collectivism .118 -.027 -.014 .012 -.051 -.089 
45. Vert. Collectivism .133 .010 .033 .060 .121 -.061 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 5 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1         
  19 20 21 22 23 24 
19. HD Cog. - Sinc. (.97) 
     
20. HD Cog. - Trustw. .579** (.94) 
    
21. HD Cog. - Reconc. .723** .666** (.93) 
   
22. HD Comp. - Sinc. .535** .401** .473** (.98) 
  
23. HD Comp. - 
Trustw. 
.399** .672** .481** .681** (.95) 
 
24. HD Comp. - 
Reconc. 
.576** .504** .677** .800** .719** (.83) 
25. HD Empow. - Sinc. .480** .430** .497** .426** .440** .489** 
26. HD Empow. - 
Trustw. 
.338** .690** .478** .310** .644** .431** 
27. HD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
.477** .448** .663** .410** .484** .613** 
28. HD Empat. - Sinc. .422** .316** .439** .280** .266** .339** 
29. HD Empat. - 
Trustw. 
.295** .632** .470** .202* .501** .329** 
30. HD Empat. - 
Reconc. 
.399** .356** .561** .230* .274** .405** 
31. B5 Agreeabl .014 -.058 -.004 .090 -.003 .027 
32. B5 Conscien -.102 .050 -.057 .052 .123 .054 
33. B5 Extravers .112 .123 .115 .190* .200* .134 
34. B5 Neurot -.053 -.067 -.036 .007 -.115 -.031 
35. B5 Openness .106 .095 .177 .069 .106 .057 
36. Self-Rep 
Dominance 
-.087 .068 -.008 .008 .111 .052 
37. Indiv. Self-Concept -.151 .005 -.051 .041 .005 .053 
38. Relat. Self-Concept .047 -.020 .063 .024 .001 .020 
39. Collec. Self-
Concept 
-.023 -.030 -.027 .048 .144 .097 
40. Entity Th. of Char. -.035 -.143 -.158 .016 -.003 -.040 
41. Entity Th. of Mor. -.117 -.216* -.160 .062 .000 .005 
42. Horiz. 
Individualism 
-.175 -.148 -.172 -.033 -.020 -.077 
43. Vert. Individualism -.088 .054 -.016 .092 .111 .148 
44. Horiz. Collectivism .153 .012 .040 .175 .108 .139 
45. Vert. Collectivism .045 -.059 -.019 .084 .027 .106 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 6 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1         
  25 26 27 28 29 30 
25. HD Empow. - Sinc. (.98) 
     
26. HD Empow. - 
Trustw. 
.667** (.92) 
    
27. HD Empow. - 
Reconc. 
.804** .716** (.89) 
   
28. HD Empat. - Sinc. .401** .362** .428** (.98) 
  
29. HD Empat. - 
Trustw. 
.432** .688** .476** .699** (.93) 
 
30. HD Empat. - 
Reconc. 
.388** .452** .531** .856** .732** (.88) 
31. B5 Agreeabl .041 .107 .070 .031 .054 .080 
32. B5 Conscien .009 .075 .001 .078 .100 .009 
33. B5 Extravers .295** .192* .221* .084 .111 -.004 
34. B5 Neurot -.188* -.193* -.200* -.193* -.169 -.178 
35. B5 Openness .217* .218* .301** .212* .241** .198* 
36. Self-Rep 
Dominance 
.042 -.004 .003 .053 .074 -.026 
37. Indiv. Self-Concept -.003 -.007 -.037 .011 -.008 -.024 
38. Relat. Self-Concept -.009 .057 .064 -.044 .028 -.014 
39. Collec. Self-
Concept 
.078 .114 .099 -.063 .025 -.094 
40. Entity Th. of Char. -.035 -.168 -.142 -.138 -.219* -.196* 
41. Entity Th. of Mor. -.081 -.240** -.149 -.126 -.229* -.133 
42. Horiz. 
Individualism 
-.130 -.124 -.093 -.120 -.134 -.178 
43. Vert. Individualism -.009 -.009 -.056 -.027 -.031 -.030 
44. Horiz. Collectivism .148 .098 .197* .035 .088 .031 
45. Vert. Collectivism .089 .036 .035 .019 .003 -.051 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 7 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1           
  31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
31. B5 Agreeabl (.80) 
       
32. B5 Conscien .089 (.71) 
      
33. B5 Extravers .071 .231* (.75) 
     
34. B5 Neurot -.362** -.205* -.328** (.88) 
    
35. B5 Openness .034 -.098 .336** -.145 (.81) 
   
36. Self-Rep 
Dominance -.453
** .226* .343** .052 .303** (.83) 
  
37. Indiv. Self-
Concept -.362
** .103 .166 .215* .154 .553** (.88) 
 
38. Relat. Self-
Concept .185
* .037 -.003 .056 .261** -.029 -.077 (.86) 
39. Collec. Self-
Concept .277
** .420** .289** -.142 .206* .119 .061 .346** 
40. Entity Th. of 
Char. 
-.074 .055 .040 .121 -.148 .069 .003 .050 
41. Entity Th. of 
Mor. 
.050 .185* .111 .008 -.170 .092 .109 -.108 
42. Horiz. 
Individualism -.185
* .101 -.080 .157 .194* .315** .201* .156 
43. Vert. 
Individualism -.352
** .215* .206* .195* -.072 .512** .738** -.134 
44. Horiz. 
Collectivism .417
** .162 .372** -.253** .307** -.047 -.094 .170 
45. Vert. 
Collectivism .164 .175 .182
* -.012 .015 -.093 -.085 .121 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 5. - part 8 of 8 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 1 
          
  39 40 41 42 43 44 45 
39. Collec. Self-
Concept 
(.77) 
      
40. Entity Th. of Char. .029 (.92) 
     
41. Entity Th. of Mor. .131 .700** (.90) 
    
42. Horiz. 
Individualism 
.041 .175 .168 (.77) 
   
43. Vert. Individualism .076 .154 .279** .203* (.79) 
  
44. Horiz. Collectivism .549** -.128 -.061 -.093 -.125 (.67) 
 
45. Vert. Collectivism .383** .006 .008 -.136 .064 .330** (.78) 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; LD - low facial dominance, HD = high facial dominance; Coefficient alphas in 
parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 6 
Main Effect of Component of Apology on Transgressor's 
Trustworthiness - Pairwise Comparisons of Target and Comparison 
Components 
Target 
Component 
Comparison 
Component 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Cognitive 
Compensating -.778* .192 .001 
Empowering .782* .216 .003 
Empathy 1.675* .225 .000 
Compensating 
Cognitive .778* .192 .001 
Empowering 1.560* .204 .000 
Empathy 2.453* .254 .000 
Empowering 
Cognitive -.782* .216 .003 
Compensating -1.560* .204 .000 
Empathy .893* .206 .000 
Empathy 
Cognitive -1.675* .225 .000 
Compensating -2.453* .254 .000 
Empowering -.893* .206 .000 
Note. Mean Difference = Target Component - Comparison 
Component; all comparisons are based on estimated marginal 
means, mean differences are significant at the .05 level. 
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Figure 2 Graph of Interaction between Facial Dominance and Components of 
Apology 
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Table 7 
High vs Low Facial Dominance Contrasts of Interaction Between Facial 
Dominance and Component of Apology in Effect on Transgressor's 
Trustworthiness 
High Dominance vs Low 
Dominance in 
M SD t df p 
Cognitive Component 0.09 2.95 0.31 116 .755 
Compensating 
Component 
0.70 3.52 2.15 116 .034 
Empowering Component -0.06 2.99 -0.22 116 .829 
Empathy Component -0.22 2.84 -0.85 116 .399 
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Table 8 
Main Effect of Component of Apology on Willingness to Reconcile 
with the Transgressor - Pairwise Comparisons of Target and 
Comparison Components 
Target 
Component 
Comparison 
Component 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
p 
Cognitive 
Compensating -0.538 .131 .000 
Empowering 0.466 .148 .012 
Empathy 1.329 .164 .000 
Compensating 
Cognitive 0.538 .131 .000 
Empowering 1.004 .153 .000 
Empathy 1.868 .193 .000 
Empowering 
Cognitive -0.466 .148 .012 
Compensating -1.004 .153 .000 
Empathy 0.863 .174 .000 
Empathy 
Cognitive -1.329 .164 .000 
Compensating -1.868 .193 .000 
Empowering -0.863 .174 .000 
Note. Mean Difference = Target Component - Comparison 
Component; all comparisons are based on estimated marginal 
means, mean differences are significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 9 
Results of Perceived Sincerity Mediation and Moderation Analysis - Main Effect of Component on 
Transgressor's Impression 
DV difference 
 
Intercept 
 
Centered 
Sum 
Sincerity 
 
Sincerity 
Difference 
facial 
dominance 
component 1 component 2 
 
β p 
 
β p 
 
β p 
low cognitive compensating 
 
0.2 0.332c 
 
0.007 0.895 
 
0.736 0.000b 
low compensating empowering 
 
0.636 0.007 
 
0.027 0.611 
 
0.479 0.000b 
low compensating empathy 
 
0.515 0.073c 
 
0.116 0.04a 
 
0.6 0.000b 
low cognitive empathy 
 
0.087 0.755c 
 
0.073 0.149 
 
0.685 0.000b 
low empowering empathy 
 
0.122 0.595c 
 
0.032 0.637 
 
0.531 0.000b 
low cognitive empowering   0.195 0.361c   0.053 0.3   0.669 0.000b 
Note. DV = Transgressor's impression, a sincerity = significant moderator, b sincerity = significant 
mediator, c full mediation by sincerity. 
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Table 10 
Results of Perceived Sincerity Mediation and Moderation Analysis - Main Effect of Component 
on Willingness to Reconcile 
DV difference 
 
Intercept 
 
Centered 
Sum 
Sincerity 
 
Sincerity 
Difference 
facial 
dominanc
e 
component 1 
component 
2  
β p 
 
β p 
 
β p 
low cognitive 
compensatin
g  
0.29 .04 
 
-0.03 .47 
 
0.58
7 
.00
b
 
low 
compensatin
g 
empowering 
 
0.50 .01 
 
-0.02 .60 
 
0.47 .00
b
 
low 
compensatin
g 
empathy 
 
0.37 .06
c
 
 
0.04 .3 
 
0.56 .00
b
 
low cognitive empathy 
 
0.02 .92
c
 
 
-0.03 .28 
 
0.6 .00
b
 
low empowering empathy 
 
0.00 .98
c
 
 
0.03 .43 
 
0.53
3 
.00
b
 
low cognitive empowering   -0.12 .45
c
   -0.02 .51   
0.53
8 
.00
b
 
Note. DV = Willingness to reconcile, 
a
 sincerity = significant moderator, 
b
 sincerity = 
significant mediator, 
c
 full mediation by sincerity. 
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Table 11 
Sequence of Pre-programmed Messages Posted by Player 2 
Round Player 2's message Decision 
1 hello! lets cooperate >_< Cooperate 
2 
 
Cooperate 
3 keep it up!! Cooperate 
4 
 
Cooperate 
5 nice job =) Cooperate 
6 
 
Cooperate 
7 
 
Compete 
8 
I thought you'd pick compete 
now 
Compete 
9 
 
Compete 
10 I felt I had to protect myself Compete 
11 
 
Compete 
12 <apology manipulation>
a
 Cooperate 
13 
 
Cooperate 
14 
 
Mirroring Player 1 
15 
 
Mirroring Player 1 
16 
 
Mirroring Player 1 
17   Mirroring Player 1 
Note. 
a 
Here one of the three manipulation statements or no text 
at all was inserted according to the condition. 
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Figure 3 Payoff Matrix used in Prisoner's Dilemma Game in Study 2 
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Table 12 – part 1 of 7 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. number of "compete" before 
transgression 
-         
2. number of compete between 
transgression and apology 
-.014 -       
3. number of compete after 
apology including the last 
round 
-.033 .309** -     
4. number of compete after 
apology without the last round 
-.019 .276** .976** -   
5. Decision - last round -.063 .305** .730** .562** - 
6. Cumulative Profit .368** .766** .008 .038 -.088 
7. trustworth .136 -.135 -.614** -.552** -.596** 
8. sincerity .109 -.189* -.430** -.352** -.475** 
9. severity .014 .051 .293** .260** .293** 
10. intentionality -.001 -.039 .136 .103 .188* 
11. voluntarity .284** -.118 -.158 -.136 -.154 
12. unexpectednes .009 .132 .330** .299** .284** 
13. vulnerability .139 .062 .000 .036 -.102 
14. irrevocability -.101 .026 .086 .045 .167* 
15. costliness .100 .057 .144 .135 .112 
16. SVO_Prosoc -.095 -.273** -.402** -.372** -.356** 
17. SVO_Indiv .071 .268** .443** .414** .378** 
18. SVO_Compet .136 .058 .028 -.001 .107 
19. male -.078 .042 .135 .132 .097 
20. age -.110 -.017 .071 .069 .050 
21. English ability -.051 .063 .166* .150* .160* 
22. B5_agree -.041 -.065 -.156* -.125 -.200** 
23. B5_conscien .016 .072 .041 .056 -.019 
24. B5_extrav -.067 -.112 -.038 -.023 -.072 
25. B5_neurot -.016 -.142 -.132 -.141 -.059 
26. B5_open -.041 -.080 -.048 -.042 -.051 
27. horiz_indiv -.031 .183* .178* .183* .101 
28. vertic_indiv .058 .232** .242** .199** .288** 
29. horiz_collect -.052 -.246** -.312** -.275** -.315** 
30. vertic_collect -.052 -.162* -.068 -.044 -.120 
31. it_char -.015 .061 .061 .068 .020 
32. it_mor -.042 .104 .143 .133 .125 
33. selfconcept_indiv .062 .050 .099 .071 .153* 
34. selfconcept_relat .026 -.128 -.254** -.219** -.275** 
35. selfconcept_collect -.078 -.225** -.224** -.195* -.236** 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
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Table 12. - part 2 of 7 
 Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  6 7 8 9 10 
7. trustworth .125 (.89)       
8. sincerity -.030 .582** (.93)     
9. severity -.068 -.337** -.158 (.85)   
10. intentionality -.086 -.257** -.158 .408** (.86) 
11. voluntarity .033 .256** .410** .043 -.015 
12. unexpectednes .026 -.316** -.222** .104 .073 
13. vulnerability .183* .189* .291** .002 .058 
14. irrevocability -.083 -.251** -.142 .211* .246** 
15. costliness .040 -.009 .153 .182* .227** 
16. SVO_Prosoc -.183* .314** .256** -.003 .095 
17. SVO_Indiv .130 -.382** -.312** .088 -.022 
18. SVO_Compet .080 -.024 -.069 -.188* -.129 
19. male -.019 -.101 -.082 .181* .235** 
20. age -.064 .005 -.073 .014 .015 
21. English ability -.018 -.158* -.111 .227** .263** 
22. B5_agree -.049 .125 .213* -.111 -.062 
23. B5_conscien .041 .070 .001 -.020 -.052 
24. B5_extrav -.034 .040 .172* -.070 -.102 
25. B5_neurot -.090 .002 .032 -.070 -.113 
26. B5_open -.070 .105 .160 -.018 .134 
27. horiz_indiv .114 -.136 -.022 .172* .239** 
28. vertic_indiv .111 -.164* -.172* .171* .081 
29. horiz_collect -.126 .281** .273** -.037 .077 
30. vertic_collect -.092 .067 .024 .018 .012 
31. it_char .055 -.008 .090 -.048 .048 
32. it_mor .057 -.155* -.078 -.013 -.031 
33. selfconcept_indiv .015 -.171* -.116 .065 .016 
34. selfconcept_relat .000 .257** .250** -.068 .130 
35. selfconcept_collect -.160* .206** .242** .045 .145 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
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Table 12. - part 3 of 7 
 Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  11 12 13 14 15 
11. voluntarity (.90)         
12. unexpectednes .023 (.72)       
13. vulnerability .335** .054 (.72)     
14. irrevocability .045 .208* .123 (.90)   
15. costliness .240** .052 .245** .093 (.72) 
16. SVO_Prosoc .063 -.108 .064 .085 -.002 
17. SVO_Indiv -.065 .243** -.092 .008 -.031 
18. SVO_Compet -.023 -.110 -.101 -.173* -.014 
19. male -.129 -.085 .013 .082 .090 
20. age -.072 -.089 .046 -.003 -.117 
21. English ability .079 .173* -.011 .117 .000 
22. B5_agree .182* .016 .189* -.151 .077 
23. B5_conscien .025 .079 -.003 -.148 -.058 
24. B5_extrav .144 .096 .052 .037 -.056 
25. B5_neurot -.059 .011 -.048 .103 -.038 
26. B5_open .099 -.018 -.009 .062 -.011 
27. horiz_indiv -.045 .167* -.002 .055 .173* 
28. vertic_indiv -.078 .184* .026 .282** .035 
29. horiz_collect .339** -.011 .209* .072 .182* 
30. vertic_collect .130 .011 .111 .084 .123 
31. it_char -.043 .035 .014 .008 .101 
32. it_mor -.072 .162 -.002 .088 .160 
33. selfconcept_indiv -.111 .117 -.063 .186* -.018 
34. selfconcept_relat .220** .062 .155 .085 .061 
35. selfconcept_collect .281** -.039 .168* .015 -.036 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
 
  
115 
 
 
Table 12. - part 4 of 7 
 Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  17 18 19 20 21 
18. SVO_Compet -.026 -       
19. male -.098 -0.15 -     
20. age -.069 -.122 .447** -   
21. English ability .049 -.072 .151* -.096 - 
22. B5_agree -.137 .052 -.070 -.029 -.014 
23. B5_conscien -.010 -.033 .119 .116 .161* 
24. B5_extrav -.003 .054 .083 .085 .064 
25. B5_neurot -.044 .033 -.370** -.235** -.188* 
26. B5_open -.065 -.085 .070 -.011 .149* 
27. horiz_indiv .076 -.024 .148 .013 .202** 
28. vertic_indiv .175* .077 .168* .043 .130 
29. horiz_collect -.258** -.114 .038 -.029 .163* 
30. vertic_collect -.015 -.019 .022 -.024 -.038 
31. it_char .183* .031 -.093 -.105 -.006 
32. it_mor .199** .061 -.091 -.101 -.056 
33. selfconcept_indiv .120 .059 .115 .067 .001 
34. selfconcept_relat -.212** -.027 -.126 -.093 .055 
35. selfconcept_collect -.186* -.108 -.064 .085 .092 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
 
  
116 
 
 
Table 12. - part 5 of 7 
 Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  22 23 24 25 26 
22. B5_agree (.73)         
23. B5_conscien .180* (.73)       
24. B5_extrav .182* .048 (.67)     
25. B5_neurot -.227** -.410** -.207** (.85)   
26. B5_open .111 .024 .134 -.152* (.74) 
27. horiz_indiv -.230** .173* -.072 -.199** .226** 
28. vertic_indiv -.164* .053 .039 .014 .091 
29. horiz_collect .375** .026 .225** -.014 .232** 
30. vertic_collect .242** .102 .144 .089 -.012 
31. it_char .043 .029 .045 .076 .080 
32. it_mor .012 -.031 .057 .119 -.073 
33. selfconcept_indiv -.183* -.030 .046 .182* -.040 
34. selfconcept_relat .282** .027 .097 .098 .300** 
35. selfconcept_collect .230** .210** .147 -.011 .158* 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
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Table 12. - part 6 of 7 
 Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2   
  27 28 29 30 31 
27. horiz_indiv (.76)         
28. vertic_indiv .305** (.70)       
29. horiz_collect -.079 -.104 (.73)     
30. vertic_collect -.088 .068 .354** (.75)   
31. it_char .135 .238** .027 .089 (.86) 
32. it_mor .086 .208** -.015 .179* .708** 
33. selfconcept_indiv .180* .581** -.092 -.029 .178* 
34. selfconcept_relat .038 .066 .522** .331** .105 
35. selfconcept_collect .079 -.013 .448** .306** .015 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.    
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Table 12. - part 7 of 7 
Correlation Table of Variables Measured in Study 2 
  32 33 34 35 
32. it_mor (.85)       
33. selfconcept_indiv .170* (.74)     
34. selfconcept_relat .017 .106 (.81)   
35. selfconcept_collect -.007 .047 .504** (.77) 
Note. * p < 0.05; ** p <  0.01; Coefficient alphas in parentheses where applicable.  
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Table 13 
Main Effect of Component of Apology on Number of Competitions after 
Apology Manipulation - Pairwise Comparisons of Target and Comparison 
Components 
Target 
Component 
Comparison 
Component 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error p 
no apology 
cognitive 1.69 0.37 0.00 
compensating 1.86 0.37 0.00 
empathy 1.79 0.37 0.00 
cognitive 
no apology -1.69 0.37 0.00 
compensating 0.17 0.37 1.00 
empathy 0.10 0.37 1.00 
compensating 
no apology -1.86 0.37 0.00 
cognitive -0.17 0.37 1.00 
empathy -0.07 0.38 1.00 
empathy 
no apology -1.79 0.37 0.00 
cognitive -0.10 0.37 1.00 
compensating 0.07 0.38 1.00 
Note. Mean Difference = Target Component - Comparison Component; all 
comparisons are based on observed means. 
 
  
120 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Main Effect of Component of Apology on Transgressor's Trustworthiness - 
Pairwise Comparisons of Target and Comparison Components 
Target 
Component 
Comparison 
Component 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error p 
no apology 
cognitive -2.42 0.86 0.03 
compensating -3.11 0.87 0.00 
empathy -3.59 0.87 0.00 
cognitive 
no apology 2.42 0.86 0.03 
compensating -0.69 0.87 1.00 
empathy -1.17 0.87 1.00 
compensating 
no apology 3.11 0.87 0.00 
cognitive 0.69 0.87 1.00 
empathy -0.48 0.89 1.00 
empathy 
no apology 3.59 0.87 0.00 
cognitive 1.17 0.87 1.00 
compensating 0.48 0.89 1.00 
Note. Mean Difference = Target Component - Comparison Component; all 
comparisons are based on observed means. 
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Figure 4 Graph of the Main Effect of Components of Apology on Number of 
Competitions after Transgressor's Apology 
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Figure 5 Graph of the Main Effect of Components of Apology on Transgressor's 
Trustworthiness 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Pilot study 1 
(A) Stimuli pictures 
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Not at all      Extremely so 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Dominance 
 Overall, how dominant is the person on the picture? 
 Overall, how submissive is the person on the picture? 
 
Attractiveness 
 Overall, how attractive is the person on the picture? 
 Overall, how good looking is the person on the picture? 
 
Trustworthiness 
 Overall, how trustworthy is the person on the picture? 
 Overall, how reliable is the person on the picture? 
 
Intelligence 
 Overall, how intelligent is the person on the picture? 
 Overall, how competent is the person on the picture? 
 
Age 
 How old is the person on the picture? ______________ 
 
(B) Demographic information 
 
Indicate your gender.   Male/Female 
How old are you?   _________ 
What ethnic group do you see yourself as? 
 
 
Chinese Indian Malay Others 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
Have you ever worked in an office/administrative position? Yes/No 
How long have you been working in office/administrative position? _______ 
 
Do you have any comments about the study?  _____________________ 
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Appendix B – Pilot study 2 
(A) Transgression scenarios 
Strongly agree    Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Severity 
 The colleague's action was serious. 
 The colleague's action was damaging. 
 The colleague's action was severe. 
 
Intentionality 
 The colleague's action was intentional. 
 The colleague's action was deliberate. 
 The colleague's action was calculated. 
Goal obstruction 
 The colleague's action was blocking my progress. 
 The colleague's action prevented me from achieving what I wanted. 
 The colleague's action frustrated my efforts. 
Norm violation 
 The colleague's action crossed the standards of professionalism. 
 The colleague's action was not how a sensible colleague should behave. 
 The colleague's action was wrong. 
Power derogation 
 The colleague's action humiliated me. 
 The colleague's action sabotaged me. 
 The colleague's action put me down. 
 
Scenario 1 
You have a colleague that you share an office with. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, but you work for different teams. The workload of the both of you 
fluctuates a lot throughout the month and since each of you can do the work of the 
other one, you help each other out during the times when one of you has too much 
work. This time it was you, who had too much work, so you asked the colleague to 
finish one relatively important task. The colleague accepted, and you considered the 
task done and focused on other tasks. After a deadline you have found out that the 
colleague did not submit the finished task. 
 
Scenario 2 
You have a colleague that you share an office with. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, and sometimes you help each other out with the workload. In one 
occasion, this colleague did not deliver a message about an important appointment 
that you consequently missed. The colleague knew about the importance of the 
message. 
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Scenario 3 
You have a colleague that you share an office with. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, and sometimes you help each other out with the workload. During a 
feedback session with your team you were asked to evaluate the performance of this 
colleague. You gave mostly positive feedback and you mentioned few negatives of 
little consequence, much less than in fact happened, because you did not want to 
humiliate the colleague in front of other team members. However, when it was the 
colleague's turn, (s)he talked mostly about your negatives and how they should be 
dealt with, even though you know that you both gave similar level of performance. 
 
Scenario 4 
You have a colleague that you share an office with. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, and sometimes you help each other out with the workload. During an 
informal team meeting, your colleague told in front of your manager about an 
incident when you misspelled a client's name, even though the colleague committed 
the same mistake in the past. This happened after the management of the company 
sent out a memo that warned employees about this particular mistake. 
 
Scenario 5 
You have a colleague that you share an office with and your roles in the company are 
very similar. The workload of the both of you fluctuates a lot throughout the month 
and since each of you can do the work of the other one, you help each other out 
during the times when one of you has too much work. This time it was you, who 
helped your colleague on an important project. Afterward, during a team meeting, 
your manager praised the work on the project and the colleague took the whole credit. 
 
Scenario 6 
You have a colleague that you share an office with. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, and sometimes you help each other out with the workload. One day you 
overhear other employees talking about a private information, that you shared in 
confidence with this colleague. There is no way the employees could know this 
information other than that the colleague told them about it. 
 
 
(B) Demographic information (The same like in Pilot study 1) 
 
  
127 
 
 
Appendix C – Pilot study 3a 
(A) Apology components 
 
Strongly agree    Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
In general, a good apology should include... 
 
Compensating component 
1. an offer to compensate me for what happened 
2. an offer to help me recover my damages 
3. an offer to do something specific to make up for what happened 
4. a suggestion that he/she reimburse me in some way 
 
Empathy component 
5. an expression of great concern for my suffering 
6. a show of empathy toward me 
7. an indication that he/she truly cares about how I feel 
8. an expression of tenderness toward me 
9. true sympathy for me 
 
Cognitive component 
10. a show of concern for breaking an important social norm 
11. an acknowledgment that he/she didn’t live up to group standards 
12. an acknowledgment that he/she violated an important group rule 
13. an admission that he/she did not live up to the standards of the group 
14. a verbal recognition that he/she failed to act as a good group member 
 
Empowering component 
15. an expression of vulnerability in front of me 
16. humble and submissive formulations 
17. self-humiliating and self-implicating expressions related to the incident 
18. and expressions of humility in front of me 
19. a denouncement of the transgressing deed 
 
(B) Demographic information (the same like in Pilot study 1) 
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Appendix D – Pilot study 3b 
(A) Apology components manipulation statements 
 
Cognitive component   
"It was wrong and it was my fault." 
 
Compensating component: 
"I would like to make it up to you – what would it take so you could trust me again?" 
 
Empowering component 
"Can you please forgive me?" 
 
Empathy component 
"I see how this made you feel." 
 
Statement '<insert manipulation statement>' expresses... 
 
Strongly agree    Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Compensating component 
1. an offer to compensate me for what happened 
2. an offer to help me recover my damages 
3. an offer to do something specific to make up for what happened 
4. a suggestion that he/she reimburse me in some way 
 
Empathy component 
5. an expression of great concern for my suffering 
6. a show of empathy toward me 
7. an indication that he/she truly cares about how I feel 
8. an expression of tenderness toward me 
9. true sympathy for me 
 
Cognitive component 
10. a show of concern for breaking an important social norm 
11. an acknowledgment that he/she didn’t live up to group standards 
12. an acknowledgment that he/she violated an important group rule 
13. an admission that he/she did not live up to the standards of the group 
14. a verbal recognition that he/she failed to act as a good group member 
 
Empowering component 
15. an expression of vulnerability in front of me 
16. humble and submissive formulations 
17. self-humiliating and self-implicating expressions related to the incident 
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18. and expressions of humility in front of me 
19. a denouncement of the transgressing deed 
 
(B) Demographic information (the same like in Pilot study 1) 
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Appendix E – Study 1 
(A) Facial dominance manipulation – 8 faces, refer to Figure 1 
 
(B) Transgression scenarios 
 
Each of the following scenarios will be presented with each of the 4 component of 
apology in random order and with randomly assigned picture of face. This will then 
be rated on the following scales: 
 
 
Strongly agree      Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Severity 
 The colleague's action was serious. 
 The colleague's action was severe. 
 
Intentionality 
 The colleague's action was intentional. 
 The colleague's action was deliberate. 
 
Sincerity of the apology 
1. The colleague's reaction was sincere. 
2. The colleague's reaction was honest. 
 
 
Willingness to Reconcile the Relationship scale (Tomlinson, Dineen & Lewicki, 
2004) 
 It is very likely that I would continue an informal relationship with the 
colleague. 
 Given the colleague's actions, I am willing to let the colleague to try to 
reconcile our relationship. 
 It would be very difficult to rebuild the relationship with the colleague back to 
the point where it was before the incident. 
 
The rest of the items will be rated on the following 7-point scale: 
 
Not at all      Extremely so 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Transgressor's Trustworthiness scale 
 Based on the colleague's reactions, do you think the colleague is trustworthy? 
 Based on the colleague's reactions, do you think the colleague will take your 
interest into account? 
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 Based on the colleague's reactions, how reliable is the colleague? 
 
 
Components of apology: 
1. I am sorry, it was wrong and it was my fault. 
2. I am sorry, I see how this made you feel. 
3. I am sorry, can you please forgive me? 
4. I am sorry, I would like to make it up to you – what would it take so you could 
trust me again? 
 
Scenario formats for Study 1: 
 
Scenario 1 
You have a colleague that you can see on the picture. You share an office and your 
roles in the company are very similar, but you work for different teams. The workload 
of the both of you fluctuates a lot throughout the month and since each of you can do 
the work of the other one, you help each other out during the times when one of you 
has too much work. This time it was you, who had too much work, so you asked the 
colleague to finish one relatively important task. The colleague accepted and you 
considered the task done and focused on other tasks. After a deadline you have found 
out that the colleague did not submit the finished task. After the incident during a 
private confrontation, the colleague said: 
 
Scenario 2 
You have a colleague that you can see on the picture. Your roles in the company are 
very similar, you share the same office and sometimes you help each other out with 
the workload. In one occasion, this colleague did not deliver a message about an 
important appointment that you consequently missed. The colleague knew about the 
importance of the message. After the incident during a private confrontation, the 
colleague said: 
 
 
(C) 16-item Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998) 
 
 
Strongly 
disagrees 
   Strongly agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
1. I often do my own thing. 
2.  I’d rather depend on myself than others. 
3. I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others. 
4. My personal identity, independent of others, is very important to me. 
132 
 
 
5. Competition is the law of nature. 
6. When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused. 
7. Winning is everything. 
8. It is important that I do my job better than others. 
9. The well being of my co-workers is important to me. 
10. If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud. 
11. I feel good when I cooperate with others. 
12. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. 
13. Parents and children must stay together as much as possible. 
14. It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I 
want. 
15. Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required. 
16. It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups. 
 
 
(D) 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) 
 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, 
do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write 
a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with that statement.  
  
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree a 
little 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree a little Agree strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
I see Myself as Someone Who...  
 
1. Is talkative  
2. Tends to find fault with others  
3. Does a thorough job  
4. Is depressed,  blue 
5. Is original, comes up with new ideas  
6. Is reserved  
7. Is helpful and unselfish with others  
8. Can be somewhat careless  
9. Is relaxed,  handles stress well  
10. Is curious about many different things  
11. Is full of energy  
12. Starts quarrels with others  
13. Is a reliable worker  
14. Can be tense  
15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker  
16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm  
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17. Has a forgiving nature  
18. Tends to be disorganized  
19. Worries a lot  
20. Has an active imagination  
21. Tends to be quiet  
22. Is generally trusting  
23. Tends to be lazy  
24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset  
25. Is inventive  
26. Has an assertive personality  
27. Can be cold and aloof  
28. Perseveres until the task is finished  
29. Can be moody  
30. Values artistic 
31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited  
32. Is considerate and kind to almost everyone  
33. Does things efficiently  
34. Remains calm in tense situations  
35. Prefers work that is routine  
36. Is outgoing,  sociable  
37. Is sometimes rude to others  
38. Makes plans and follows through with them  
39. Gets nervous easily  
40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas  
41. Has few artistic interests  
42. Likes to cooperate with others  
43. Is easily distracted  
44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature 
 
 
(E) Levels of Self-concept scale (Selenta & Lord, 2005) 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
1. I thrive on opportunities to demonstrate that my abilities or talents are better 
than those of other people. 
2. I have a strong need to know how I stand in comparison to my coworkers. 
3. I often compete with my friends. 
4. I feel best about myself when I perform better than others. 
5. I often find myself pondering over the ways that I am better or worse off than 
other people around me. 
6. If a friend was having a personal problem, I would help him/her even if it 
meant sacrificing my time or money. 
7. I value friends who are caring, empathic individuals. 
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8. It is important to me that I uphold my commitments to significant people in 
my life. 
9. Caring deeply about another person such as a close friend or relative is 
important to me. 
10. Knowing that a close other acknowledges and values the role that I play in 
their life makes me feel like a worthwhile person. 
11. Making a lasting contribution to groups that I belong to, such as my work 
organization, is very important to me. 
12. When I become involved in a group project, I do my best to ensure its success. 
13. I feel great pride when my team or group does well, even if I’m not the main 
reason for its success. 
14. I would be honored if I were chosen by an organization or club that I belong 
to, to represent them at a conference or meeting. 
15. When I'm part of a team, I am concerned about the group as a whole instead 
of whether individual team members like me or whether I like them. 
 
(F) Implicit Theory of Morality scale (Chiu et al., 1997). 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
1. The kind of person someone is something very basic about them and can't be 
changed very much. 
2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't 
really be changed. 
3. Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to 
really change that. 
4. A person’s moral character is something very basic about them and it can’t be 
changed much. 
5. Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their 
personality. It cannot be changed much. 
6. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits (e.g., 
conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty). 
 
(G) Demographic information (the same as in Pilot study 1) 
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Appendix F – Study 2 
(A) Facial dominance manipulation – 8 faces, refer to Figure 1 
 
(B) Player 2's algorithm – refer to Table 11 
 
Components of apology manipulation statements: 
 
Cognitive component 
“I'm sorry, it's my fault we are losing points now...could we both cooperate again?” 
 
Empathy component 
“I'm sorry for this, I see how this made you feel...could we both cooperate again?” 
 
Compensating component 
“I'm sorry for this, is there anything I can do so we could both cooperate again?” 
 
No apology condition 
Player 2 just switched to cooperative choices. 
 
 
(C) Measures 
 
 
Strongly agree      Strongly disagree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Sincerity of the apology 
1. The Player 2's attempt to restore cooperation was sincere. 
2. The Player 2's attempt to restore cooperation was genuine. 
Unexpectedness 
3. Player 2's attempt to reconcile was unexpected. 
4. Player 2 was unlikely to try to reconcile like this. 
5. Player 2's attempt to reconcile was unexpected. 
Vulnerability 
6. Player 2's reconciliation showed that he/she was willing to drop his/her guard. 
7. Player 2 was willing to step down to try to reconcile like this. 
8. Player 2's attempt to reconcile reflected his/her vulnerability 
Novelty 
9. I believe Player 2 tried to reconcile out of his/her own initiative. 
10. I believe it was Player 2's own decision to try to reconcile. 
11. Player 2 tried to reconcile out of his/her own will. 
Irrevocability 
12. It would be easy for Player 2 to go back on his/her word. 
13. It would be easy for Player 2 to withdraw his/her attempt to reconcile. 
Costliness 
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14. It had to be uncomfortable for Player 2 to try to reconcile like this. 
15. It takes a lot to reconcile like this. 
16. The reconciliation was at Player 2's expense. 
 
The rest of the items will be rated on the following 7-point scale: 
 
Not at all      Extremely so 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Transgressor's Trustworthiness scale 
1. Based on the attempt to restore cooperation, do you think Player 2 is 
trustworthy? 
2. Based on the attempt to restore cooperation, do you think Player 2 will take 
your interest into account? 
3. Based on the attempt to restore cooperation, how reliable is Player 2? 
 
 
(D) 16-item Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism (Triandis & 
Gelfand, 1998) – the same as in Study 1 
 
(E) 44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) – the same as in Study 1 
 
(F) Levels of Self-concept scale (Selenta & Lord, 2005) – the same as in Study 1 
 
(G) Implicit Theory of Morality scale (Chiu et al., 1997) – the same as in Study 1 
 
(H) Social Values Orientations scale (Van Lange, 1999) 
 
In this section, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with 
another person, whom we will refer to simply as the "Other." This other person is 
someone you do not know and that you will not knowingly meet in the future. Both 
you and the "Other" person will be making choices by circling either the letter A, B, 
or C. Your own choices will produce points for both yourself and the "Other" person. 
Likewise, the other's choice will produce points for him/her and for you. Every point 
has value: The more points you receive, the better for you, and the more points the 
"Other" receives, the better for him/her. Here's an example of how this task works: 
 
 A B C 
You get  500 500 550 
Other gets 100 500 300 
 
In this example, if you chose A you would receive 500 points and the other would 
receive 100 points; if you chose B, you would receive 500 points and the other 500; 
and if you chose C, you would receive 550 points and the other 300. So, you see that 
your choice influences both the number of points you receive and the number of 
points the other receives. 
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Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers—choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, 
remember that the points have value; The more of them you accumulate, the better for 
you. Likewise, from the "other's" point of view, the more points s/he accumulates, the 
better for him/her. For each of the nine choice situations, circle A, B, or C, depending 
on which column you prefer most: 
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1.  
 A B C 
You get 480 540 480 
Other gets 80 280 480 
 
2. 
 A B C 
You get 560 500 500 
Other gets 300 500 100 
 
3.  
 A B C 
You get 520 520 580 
Other gets 520 120 320 
4.  
 A B C 
You get 500 560 490 
Other gets 100 300 490 
 
5. 
 A B C 
You get 560 500 490 
Other gets 300 500 90 
6.  
 A B C 
You get 500 500 570 
Other gets 500 100 300 
 
7. 
 A B C 
You get 510 560 510 
Other gets 510 300 110 
 
8. 
 A B C 
You get 550 500 500 
Other gets 300 100 500 
 
9. 
 A B C 
You get 480 490 540 
Other gets 100 490 300 
 
